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RESTRICTIONS ON ANAPHORA
AND OTHER PROBLEMS

Masahiro Kato

1.0 INTRODUCTION

I have made it clear in Kato (1982) that Principle of Anaphora (PA) and Anaphora Restriction I (AR I) are indispensable to interpret the anaphoric relation of definite NPs in the sentences below:

(1) *I talked to him about John.
(2) *On him, Bill depended for John’s help.

Since neither him nor the full NP c-commands the other, the syntactic restriction on anaphora proposed in Reinhart (1976, 1981, 1983) incorrectly predicts that coreference between pronouns and full NPs should be possible.

In this paper, I will propose one more restriction on the anaphoric relation (Anaphora Restriction II). Further, I will show that by AR I, AR II and PA, we can consistently explain the cases which Reinhart’s restriction cannot handle as well as the cases which it can. I will also show that a linguistically significant generalization can be achieved by incorporating these constraints into the grammar of English. To put it more concretely, we can say that the definite pronouns are, fundamentally, used anaphorically in English.
1.1 ANAPHORA RESTRICTION II

1.1.1. *Formulation of Anaphora Restriction II*: Let us first consider the apparent counterexamples to Principle of Anaphora (PA) proposed in Kato (1982).

(1) Principle of Anaphora (PA):

Principle of Anaphora (PA)

NP1 and NP2 are noncoreferential unless the perceptual order \([ \ldots [ NP_1 \text{ antecedent }] \ldots [ NP_2 \text{ anaphor }] \ldots ]\) is kept on the level of perceptual processing.

(2) Rosa is kissing *him* passionately in *Ben's* high school picture.

Since the sentence in (2) apparently has the structural order \([ \ldots \text{anaphor} \ldots \text{antecedent} \ldots ]\), it is incorrectly marked as unacceptable by PA. Closer examination, however, reveals that the PP in (2) is a S-PP, which originates in sentence initial position. We can thus assume that the S-PP, *in Ben's high school picture*, has been moved to sentence final position. Thus, the surface structure of (2) is as follows:

(3) \([\text{pp e}]\) Rosa is kissing *him* passionately in Ben's high school picture.

It is obvious from the sentences below that coreference is permissible in cases where the antecedents are in S-PP's, even if the sentence has the structural order \([ \ldots \text{anaphor} \ldots \text{antecedent} \ldots ]\). Coreference is blocked in the cases where antecedents are in VP-PP's:

(4) We sent *him* to West Point in order to please *Ben's* moth-
er. (S–PP)
(5) We'll just have to fire him whether McIntosh likes it or not. (S–PP)
(6) Rosa won't like him anymore, with Ben's mother hanging around all the time. (S–PP)
(7) *Rosa tickled him in the baby's bed. (VP–PP)
(8) *It's time to put him in the baby's bed. (VP–PP)

From the observations above we can derive the following restriction:

(9) Anaphora Restriction II (AR II)

In the structure [[α₁ e]...NP₂][αᵢ...NP₁...], NP₁ and NP₂ are noncoreferential unless NP₁ is the antecedent of NP₂¹.

AR II (9) can correctly account for the sentence in (2), for in (3), him = NP₂, and Ben's = NP₁. Let us examine the cases presented in (4)–(6). The corresponding surface structures are as follows:

(10) [pp e] we sent him to West Point in order to please Ben's mother.
(11) [pp e] we'll just have to fire him whether McIntosh likes it or not.
(12) [pp e] Rosa won't like him anymore, with Ben's mother hanging around all the time.

In (10), NP₁ = Ben, and NP₂ = him, in (11), NP₁ = McIntosh and NP₂ = him, and in (12), NP₁ = Ben's and NP₂ = him. Thus, AR II (9) correctly marks them as acceptable.

On the other hand, since the PP's in (7)–(8) are VP–PP's,
they are generated in post-verbal position in the base. Thus, they do not leave sentence-initial traces. As a result, neither AR I nor AR II applies to (7) and (8), and Principle of Anaphora correctly marks them as unacceptable, for they violate the perceptual order [...antecedent...anaphor...].

1.1.2. The relation between the Principle of Anaphora and the Anaphora Restriction II: I have already made it clear in Kato (1982) that the Principle of Anaphora is a constraint assigned to a component to be called Discourse Grammar, while Anaphora Restriction I should be assigned to Sentence Grammar. I will show that the same reasoning holds with respect to the relation between the Principle of Anaphora and Anaphora Restriction II. Consider the following sentences:

(13) a. Ben’s mother has been complaining about her grandson John, for he is always flirting with the young house maids. So we sent him to West Point in order to please Ben’s mother.

b. We sent him to West Point in order to please Ben’s mother.

In (13a), it is most natural to interpret the referent of him as John, for the preceding discourse encourages the association of him with the established topic John. This force is stronger than that created by the sentence, which encourages the association of him with Ben’s. Consider sentence (13b). In isolation, it is most natural to interpret the referent of him as Ben. In this case, it is necessary to resort to an interpretive rule in Sentence Grammar that will give an appropriate interpretation to him; namely AR II. As a result, AR II should be assigned to Sentence Grammar.
1.2 Other problems to Reinhart’s restriction

Let us consider again examples where the possibilities of coreference vary with the length of the sentence: (Lakoff (1968), Akmajian and Jackendoff (1970) and Wasow (1972))

(14) a. *In John’s apartment, he smokes pot.
   b. In John’s apartment near the railroad tracks in the Pamrapo district of Bayonne N.J., he smokes pot.

(15) a. *In George’s apartment, Mary kissed him.
   b. In George’s rotting hovel of an apartment on Scrac Street, Mary finally broke down and kissed him.

(16) a. *In Zelda’s bed, she spent her sweetest hours.
   b. In the bed which Zelda stole from the Salvation Army, she spent her sweetest hours.

Reinhart’s restriction can correctly account for the unacceptability of the (a)-sentences in (14), (16), for the full NP’s are in the c-command domain of the pronouns, and hence must be pronouns in order to be coreferential with the pronouns. In the (b)-sentences in (14), (16) on the other hand, coreference is possible, although the structure of these sentences is basically the same as those underlying the (a)-sentences. Thus, Reinhart’s restriction cannot account for these cases.²

If we consider the PP’s more closely, we find that the PP’s in the (a)-sentences are obviously VP–PP’s (‘place–specifying nonthematic adverbs’, in, Kuno’s terms (Kuno (1979 : 125)), while the PP’s in the (b)-sentences seem to switch categories, going from VP–PP’s to S–PP’s (‘scene–setting thematic adverbs’, in Kuno’s term). The reason this category switch occurs in the cases cited may be that the increase of information in the VP–
PP’s about the places in question makes them lose their original function as place specifiers and assume the new role as scene-setters which is typical to S-PP’s.

Thus, we can assume the PP’s in the (b)-sentences are S-PP’s. Since S-PP’s are assumed to originate in sentence initial position, the Principle of Anaphora can correctly account for the acceptability of the (b)-cases in (14)–(16).

In passing, the following sentences are apparently counter-examples to AR I, if the PP’s are interpreted as having been preposed from sentence final position (namely, if they are interpreted as VP-PP’s):

(17) In Mary’s apartment, a thief assaulted her.
(18) From Mary’s apartment, she could see half of Paris.

But the following pairs reveal that the PP’s in question function as thematic S-PP’s rather than place specifying VP-PP’s:

(19) What happened in Mary’s apartment?
    In Mary’s apartment, a thief assaulted her.
(20) Tell me about Mary’s apartment.
    From Mary’s apartment, she could see half of Paris.

Thus, we see that the PP’s in (17) and (18) are ‘scene-setting thematic’ S-PP’s. As a result, PA correctly marks (17) and (18) as acceptable, for they keep the perceptual order [. . . antecedent . . . anaphor . . .].

Consider the following examples which Reinhart’s restriction cannot account for:

(21) ?? We talked about Rosa’s son to/with her.
(22) ?? I spoke, in Ben’s office, to him.
(23) I referred Dr. Levin's students to him.

Reinhart admits the deficiency of her restriction as follows:

I will not attempt here a full survey of anaphora options inside the VP. It seems clear, however, that a fully formal account in terms of branching nodes is not sufficient to determine domain relations in this case...I will leave open for further study the questions whether inside the VP, linear order may play (exceptionally) a role in determining anaphora. (Reinhart (1976: 157))

All these sentences are marked incorrectly acceptable by Reinhart's restriction, since neither NP is in the other's domain. In our approach, the sentences in (21)-(23) have the surface structures in (21)'-(22)'

(21)' We talked about Rosa's son to/with her [pp e]
(22)' I spoke, in Ben's office, to him [pp e]
(23)' I referred Dr. Levin's students to him [pp e]

In (21)'-(23)', since the full NP's correspond to NP₂ and the pronouns correspond to NP₁, and the NP₁'s are not the antecedents to the NP₂'s, AR I correctly marks them low in acceptability.

Lakoff points out that cleft sentences show mysterious behavior with respect to coreference (Lakoff (1968: 285–286)):

(24) It was his dog that John bit.
(25) *It was John’s dog that he bit.
(26) *It was John’s dog, which Mary likes, that he told her about.
(27) *It was John’s dog, which she likes, that he told Mary about.
According to Emonds (1976), the structures of (24) and (25) are as follows:

(24)'

(25)'

In (24)' since neither John nor his is in the c-command domain of the other, Reinhart's restriction can correctly account for the acceptability of (24). In (25)', on the other hand, although the structural relation is the same as that of (24)', coreference is blocked. Hence, Reinhart's restriction incorrectly marks the sentence in (25) as fully acceptable.

Consider the structural relations of (26) and (27) represented as in (26)' and (27)'

(26)'

(27)'}
In (26)', since neither John’s nor he, and neither Mary nor her are in one another’s c-command domain, Reinhart’s restriction incorrectly marks the sentence in (26) as fully acceptable. The same is true in (27)’: since neither John’s nor he, and neither she nor Mary are in one another’s c-command domain, Reinhart’s restriction cannot account for the unacceptability of the sentence in (27).

Now I will show that AR I, proposed in Kato (1982) as in (28), correctly accounts for the sentences in (24)-(27).

(28) Anaphora Restriction I (AR I)

In the structure \([s \ldots [\alpha_i \ldots NP_2 \ldots] \ldots NP_1 \ldots [\alpha_i e] \ldots]\), NP_1 and NP_2 are noncoreferential unless NP_1 is the antecedent of NP_2. (Where \([\alpha_i e]\) is a trace left by preposing transformations)

Consider first the corresponding surface structures:

(24)” It was his dog that John bit \([NP e]\)
(25)” It was John’s dog that he bit \([NP e]\)
(26)” It was John’s dog, which Mary likes, that he told her about \([NP [NP_i e] \ldots [NP_j e]]\)
(27)” It was John’s dog, which she likes, that he told Mary about \([NP [NP_i e] \ldots [NP_j e] \ldots]\)
In (24), since \( NP_1 = John \), and \( NP_2 = his \), and \( NP_1 \) is the antecedent of \( NP_2 \), AR I correctly marks the sentence in (24) acceptable. In (25), since \( NP_1 = he \) and \( NP_2 = John's \), and \( NP_1 \) is not the antecedent of \( NP_2 \), AR I correctly accounts for the unacceptability of the sentence in (25). In (26), in the case of the pair \( John's \) and \( he \), \( NP_1 = he \) and \( NP_2 = John's \) and \( NP_1 \) is not the antecedent of \( NP_2 \); in the case of the pair \( Mary \) and \( her \), \( NP_1 = her \) and \( NP_2 = Mary \), and \( NP_1 \) is not the antecedent of \( NP_2 \), thus, AR I correctly marks the sentence in (26) unacceptable on two accounts. In (27), although in the case of the pair \( Mary \) and \( she \), AR I marks it acceptable because \( NP_1 = Mary \) and \( NP_2 = she \) and \( NP_1 \) is the antecedent of \( NP_2 \), in the case of the pair \( John's \) and \( he \), AR I blocks coreference between \( John's \) and \( he \), since \( NP_1 = he \) and \( NP_2 = John's \), and \( NP_1 \) is not the antecedent of \( NP_2 \).

In this section, I have demonstrated that Anaphora Restriction I can correctly account for all the examples in (14)–(16), (21)–(23) and (25)–(27) which Reinhart's restriction cannot account for. It is evident from the observations above that the deficiency of Reinhart's restriction is due to its crucial dependence on the notion "first branching node".

1.3 Additional predictions made by Anaphora Restriction I and the Principle of Anaphora

1.3.1 PP-extraction and anaphora: Consider the examples below, where in the (b) and (c) cases, have been extracted from embedded sentences:
(29) a. In Rosa's wedding picture, she looks attractive. (S–PP)
    b. In her wedding picture, Rosa hopes that she will look attractive.
    c. *In Rosa's wedding picture, she hopes that she will look attractive.

(30) a. In Ben's family, he is considered a genius. (S–PP)
    b. In his family, Ben told me that he is considered a genius.
    c. *In Ben's family, he told me that he is considered a genius.

Since the PP's in question are all S–PP's, the sentences in (29b), (29c), (30b), and (30c) have the following surface structures:

(29)' b. In her wedding picture, Rosa hopes that [pp e] she will look attractive.
    c. In Rosa's wedding picture, she hopes that [pp e] she will look attractive.

(30), b. In his family, Ben talk me that [pp e] he is considered a genius.
    c. In Ben's family, he told me that [pp e] he is considered a genius.

The extracted S–PP's leave traces in the initial position of the embedded sentences. In these cases where preposing transformations are involved, we resort to AR I. In (29b)', NP₁ = Rosa and NP₂ = her. and in (30b)', NP₁ = Ben and NP₂ = his, and the NP₁'s are the antecedents of the NP₂'s. Thus, AR I correctly marks (29b) and (30b) as acceptable. On the other hand, in (29c)', NP₁ = she and NP₂ = Rosa, and in (30c)', NP₁ = he and
NP₂ = Ben’s and in both cases the NP₁’s are not the antecedents of the NP₂’s. Hence coreference is correctly blocked by AR I.

Compare the following sentences where the application of Question Formation changes the acceptability of the sentences:

(31) When she finishes school, Rosa promised Ben that she will go to London.
(32) *When she finishes school, has Rosa promised Ben that she will go to London?

The surface structure of (31) and (32) are as follows:

(31)’ When she finishes school, Rosa promised Ben that [pp e] she will go to London.
(32)’ When she finishes school, has Rosa promised Ben that [pp e] she will go to London.

In (31)’, since NP₁ = Rosa and NP₂ = she, and NP₁ is the antecedent of NP₂, AR I correctly marks (31) as acceptable. In (32)’, since NP₁ = Rosa and NP₂ = she, and NP₁ is the antecedent of NP₂, AR I marks (32) acceptable. But this is incorrect, and we have an apparent counterexample to AR I. Closer examination, however, reveals the fact that the unacceptability of (32) is due to the syntactic constraint on the COMP Theory, rather than coreference between Rosa and she. The extracted PP (when she finishes school) is a S–PP of the that–clause and, at the same time, a VP–PP, because the S node which dominated the PP before preposing is dominated by the matrix VP. Hence, the extracted PP behaves like a VP constituent and is attached to the COMP position which is already filled by Question marker. This causes the same problem which was discussed in chapter III, that is, two elements are occupying the COMP at the same time.
In short, (32) has already been marked unacceptable on the level of syntax before the application of the interpretive rule AR I.

1.3.2 Topicalization and anaphora: Ross formulates Topicalization as follows:

\[(33) \text{Topicalization} \]
\[X \longrightarrow \text{NP} \longrightarrow Y \]
\[1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad \text{---optional} \]
\[2\#[1 \phi \quad 3] \quad (\# \text{ stands for Chomsky adjunction}) \]
(Ross (1967c: 232))

Given Topicalization as a transformation, where do topicalized elements attach within the sentential structure? The application of WH–Question Formation to the topicalized sentence answer the question: (Reinhart (1976: 91))

(34) *Rosa, who can stand, anyway!
(35) *Rosa, when did you last see?

The unacceptability of (34) and (35) tells us that the topicalized elements are attached to the COMP position. (34) and (35) are thus unacceptable for the same reason that (32) is unacceptable.

Since Topicalization is a transformation which moves elements into sentence initial position, they leave traces in their original positions. Keeping this in mind, consider the following sentences:

(36) *Sonya, she denies that Hirschel admires.
(37) *Sonya's recipes, she will never give you.
(38) Sonya’s recipes, you’ll never get from her.
(39) Sonya, her husband would give his life for.

The surface structures of (36)–(39) are as follows:

(36)’ Sonya, she denies that Hirschel admires [NP e]
(37)’ Sonya’s recipes, she will never give you [NP e]
(38)’ Sonya’s recipes, you’ll never get [NP e] from her
(39)’ Sonya, her husband would give his life for [NP e]

In (36)’, and (37)’, NP₁ = she and NP₂ = Sonya, Sonya’s, and
the NP₁’s are not the antecedents of the NP₂’s. Hence, AR I
marks (36) and (37) as unacceptable. In (38)’, on the other
hand, since NP₁ = Sonya’s and NP₂ = her, and NP₁ is the anteced-
ent of NP₂, AR I correctly marks (38) as acceptable. As for
(39)’, NP₁ = her and NP₂ = Sonya, and NP₁ is not antecedent of
NP₂. Hence, AR I incorrectly blocks possible coreference in
(39). For the moment, I leave this problem open for further
study.

1.3.3 Left Dislocation and anaphora: Ross formulates Left Dis-
location as follows:³

(40) Left Dislocation
    X---NP---Y
    1 2 3 ---optional
    2#[1 φ 3] (# stands for Chomsky adjunction)

There are, however, some linguists who argue that Left Disloca-
tion cannot be a transformation. Reinhart reports that van
Riemsdijk and Zwartz (1974) offer several strong arguments to
the effect that Left Dislocation cannot be a transformation:
...they suggest that 'left-dislocated' elements are generated in the initial position under a category higher than the S which dominates the rest of the sentence. (Reinhart (1976: 90))

Rodman (1974) also claims that left–dislocated elements are generated in initial position in the base and proposes the following underlying phrase structure rule:

1. S ←X

where S is the starting symbol of a phrase structure grammar (Rodman (1974: 21))

I adopt here Rodman's analysis of Left Dislocation. Consider the sentences below which contain left–dislocated elements:

1. (As for) Sonya, she denies that Hirschel admires her.
2. (As for) Sonya's recipes, she will never give them to you.
3. (As for) Sonya's recipes, an expert has praised them in the contest.
4. *(As for) her, Sonya denies that Hirschel admires her.
5. (As for) Sonya, John told Sonya that Hirschel admires her.
6. (As for) Harry, Bill has warned Harry that he must not steal any more apples.

Since I assume that the left–dislocated elements in (42)–(48) are generated in initial position, the Principle of Anaphora can account for all the sentences in (42)–(48). On the other hand, Reinhart's restriction incorrectly marks (47) and (48) unacceptable, for the second full NP's (Sonya, Harry) are in the c-com-
mand domain of the left-dislocated full NP's \((Sonya, Harry)\). Thus, the second full NP's must be pronouns in order to be corefrential with the left-dislocated full NP's.

1.4 Summary

In 1.1, considering the properties of S–PP's discussed in Kato (1982), I proposed Anaphora Restriction II in order to account for such cases as (2):

\[(2)\] Rosa is kissing \textit{him} passionately in Ben's high school picture.

I also explained the relation between the Principle of Anaphora and Anaphora Restriction II. In 1.2, I illustrated the inability of Reinhart's restriction to account for sentences which seem to require semantic consideration, sentences with lengthened initial PP's, for example. In 1.3, I demonstrated that the Principle of Anaphora and Anaphora Restriction I and II have broader predictive powers with respect to coreference than Reinhart's restriction.

Footnotes

1. Since I noted in Kato (1982) that I would at present refrain from committing myself to Trace Theory, the fact that AR II (9) might formally violate Proper Binding, proposed in Fiengo (1977: 53), is not of theoretical importance.
2. With respect to this problem, see Kato (1982).
3. Emmonds assumes that Topicalization and Left Dislocation are Root Transformations. (Emmonds (1976: 31, 33))

4. Since I could not get the original copy of Rodman (1974), I refer to "海外英語学論集 1976", PP. 7–35, 英潮社

5. This phrase structure rule is quite similar in form to that which I proposed with respect to S–PP’s in Kato (1980). Semantically, the function of left dislocated elements and S–PP’s are also very similar; namely, both of them are used to represent thematic elements. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to generalize them and integrate them into one phrase structure rule. I will leave this question open for future study.

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