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Ulaanbaatar Process: its philosophy, practice and achievements

March 2016   REC-PP-03-EN

RECNA Policy Paper

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
Ulaanbaatar Process: its philosophy, practice and achievements

March 2016   REC-PP-03-EN

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Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
Acronyms in the concept paper and documents referred therein

ACT - Asia Community Trusty
CSO - Civil Society Organization
D&M WG - Dialogue & Mediation Working Group
DRC - Donor Relations Coordinator
GFP - Gender Focal Point
ICAN - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ILPI - International Law and Policy Institute
MCC - Mennonite Central Committee
MFP - Media Focal Point
M&MC - Dialogue & Mediation Coordinator
MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSU - Maritime State University
NARPI - Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute
NEA-NWFZ - Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NWFZ - Nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWFS - Nuclear-weapon-free status
NPT Prepcom - NPT Preparatory Committee
NPT Revcon - NPT Review Conference
Peace Portal - Northeast Asia Community on Peace Portal
PEWG - Peace Education Working Group
RAA - Regional Action Agenda
RC - Regional Coordinator
RFP - Regional Focal Point
RLO - Regional Liaison Officer
RSG - Regional Steering Group
UND - Ulaanbaatar dialogue
UBP - Ulaanbaatar process
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Executive summary

This concept paper deals with the brief history and philosophy of the Ulaanbaatar process launched in 2015. Northeast Asia is a dynamically developing region that is rightly considered as an important engine of world economic development. However, it is also a region with lingering Cold War structures and mindset, due to the division on the Korean peninsula and the colliding interests of the great powers, making it a dangerous place, if not an explosive powder keg. The North Korean nuclear weapons program is exacerbating this tension. The Six Party Talks (SPT) have generated much hope in addressing the Korean problem, especially in denuclearizing the peninsula, but have been deadlocked since 2009. Due to the rigid positions of the parties to the SPT, not only has no progress has been made but tensions have escalated. Time is playing into the hands of the hawks. An agreement is becoming less likely and the breakdown of negotiations may lead to unintentional or intentional the use of force.

On the other hand, contemporary international relations demonstrate that civil society can play an important and useful role in alleviating tension, promoting confidence, and facilitating dialogue. Therefore, civil society organizations (CSOs) in Northeast Asia, members of the GPPAC network, are searching practical ways to prevent deterioration of the situation. CSOs make use of their comparative advantage of being more flexible than governments on such issues. Mongolia, a small country not aligned with any great power, maintains good relations with all the countries of the region. It is pursues an active foreign policy of peace and cooperation and is trying to serve as an honest regional facilitator. Through its policy of institutionalizing the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status it has earned the respect of all the states of the region. The Mongolian NGO Blue Banner plays a notable and active role in promoting Mongolia’s status as well as developing relations with other CSOs of the region. In 2005 GPPAC/NEA launched a Track-2 civil society dialogue that seeks to strengthen civil society role in searching effective ways to support and complement the Track-1 and Track 1.5 efforts to develop an effective regional mechanism of dialogue and cooperation.

Though Ulaanbaatar process (UBP) was launched only in 2015, the track record of GPPAC/NEA activities allows the author to make some suggestions on how the process could be made more effective and play an active role in the region.
Introduction

Though almost a quarter of a century has passed since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia, and especially the Korean peninsula, is still virtually in a state of Cold War. Confrontational rhetoric, intimidating war games, nuclear weapons, and missile tests add to rising historical and territorial disputes. There is no institutional mechanism and a weak multilateral tradition to address these regional security challenges. If this situation persists, one cannot rule out the escalation of nuclear and conventional arms races, leading to the further deterioration of the political climate.

Aware of these risks, the countries of this region and beyond are making concrete proposals to address the challenges of this Cold War mindset. These policies include the Obama administration’s “Pivot to East Asia”, Vladimir Putin’s “Far East Development Policy”, Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”, Park Geun-hyeon’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) initiative, and Ts. Elbegdorj’s Dialogue for Northeast Asian security (Ulaanbaatar dialogue – UBD). Three of the overdue pressing political issues of the region are ending the formal state of war on the Korean peninsula, normalizing relations, and duly addressing the destabilizing nuclear-weapon program of DPRK. These are *sine qua non* conditions for normalizing relations. Though the Six Party Talks (SPT) have made some progress, they have stalled since 2009 with little hope of resumption. The parties are sticking to their rigid policies and positions. Even their unofficial approaches are not producing positive results. “Lost time is never found again,” especially in today's fast changing world.

States are not the only actors in today’s world. The private sector and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are playing an active role. As recent history demonstrates, civil society promotes greater understanding within and among states. Civil society in some countries of Northeast Asia are quite vocal and can influence outcomes indirectly. In other countries they have direct links with the decision-making bodies, serving as effective channels for promoting dialogue and cooperation. However, compared to some other regions, the impact of civil society is yet to be felt, especially in the areas of regional security and cooperation, where governments are reluctant to cede their monopoly on power.

One of the most pressing issues in Northeast Asia is successfully addressing the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. While the SPT is in a deadlock, the DPRK continues to improve its nuclear arsenal. In January 2016, it tested a fourth nuclear weapon followed by a missile test in February. This hydrogen nuclear weapon, whether successful or not, shows that the country is determined to miniaturize its weapons so that they can put them in missiles as warheads or bombs. The policy of “strategic patience” needs to be reviewed and a more active policy needs to be pursued to address this issue.

CSOs, think tanks, and research centers make meaningful contributions to addressing national and regional challenges. Since 2005, the Northeast Asian regional network of GPPAC (GPPAC/NEA) works to bolster greater cooperation of CSOs to promote a culture of dialogue and cooperation. Building upon their regional networks developed in the past decade,

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1 Examination of the role of the private sector needs a separate study.
GPPAC/NEA officially launched in 2015 the Ulaanbaatar Process (UBP) for promoting peace and stability. Its focus is not limited to the nuclear weapons issue on the Korean peninsula. However, since the Korean peninsula issues are important to stimulate dialogue and cooperation in other areas, the nuclear issue must be addressed. Addressing these non-nuclear issues can create conditions for progress on the nuclear-weapon issue.

The accumulated experience of a decade of open cooperation among the parties to UBP is a powerful asset for growing regional cooperation. The talks included frank and open discussion of the challenges and opportunities under Chatham house rules. Ulaanbaatar is an appropriate venue for the following reasons: Mongolia’s active foreign policy, the absence of territorial problems and border issues with its neighbors, experience in promoting the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS), and good relations with all the countries of the region.

The purpose of this paper is to show how UBP can contribute to addressing the region’s common interests and challenges. In doing so the paper also makes recommendations on how to improve the process.

This paper is organized into four sections. First it provides a brief problem description on the situation in Northeast Asia and the need for a proper regional security mechanism. It also briefly dwells on the comparative advantages of the civil society and its role in the Northeast Asian context.

The second section describes the active global civil society organization affiliated with GPPAC/NEA, which in the past decade has been playing an important role in the region. Hence the paper will briefly dwell on GPPAC/NEA’s organization and activities.

The third section discusses the role of Mongolia’s active foreign policy. Also this section summarizes the latest regional initiatives and the role of the Blue Banner NGO, which plays an active role in promoting the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

Finally, the fourth section details the history of the UBP and the author provides some suggestions on how to effectively promote the process. These suggestions are based on his ten years of GPPAC/NEA experience.
Problem description

Though Northeast Asia is one of the most dynamically developing regions of the world. The potential for further growth is high. However, there are numerous political roadblocks that hinder it. The discrepancy between its economic potential and reality, known as the Asian paradox, needs to be addressed if progress is to be made. Among the political obstacles are the unresolved historical and territorial issues between major countries. There is also division and discord between the North and South on the Korean peninsula. The current security situation in Northeast Asia is plagued by the Cold War mentality and approaches to many issues. This zero-sum game mentality is still alive and hampers greater confidence and the promotion of common and cooperative security. Rising nationalism in these countries, especially on sovereignty issues and the growing influence of public opinion and the social media, strongly influence government policies and politics. Hardships in economic development play into nationalist foreign policy decisions that divert attention away from long-term common regional goals.

Another challenge that needs to be underlined in this connection is the lack of a security mechanism in this region. The political, strategic and military interests of the great and regional powers, the US, China, Russia, Japan, and two Koreas intersect with the economic interests. Bilateral alliances play a dominant role in diplomacy because multilateralism is weak. Hence there is a high risk of strategic misunderstanding, especially in times of crisis. Establishing a Northeast Asian security mechanism would, like in Europe and elsewhere, provide institutionalized communication channels at governmental, think tank and other non-governmental levels. The SPT is considered the closest alternative to an institutional mechanism for addressing issues of overcoming the Cold War mentality and promoting regional peace and security. However, as the events of the past seven years have vividly demonstrated, the SPT structure is rigid and there is little room for fostering mutual understanding and flexibility. The parties prioritize either their narrow national or alliance interests. The needed political will is absent; with no mechanism to generate goodwill through dialogue, understanding, foresight, and flexibility. Unfortunately, mutual suspicion and recriminations lead to inflammatory rhetoric and escalation of tension. In such an atmosphere, coupled with rising nationalism and recurring territorial disputes, the result is an escalation of tension. It takes foresight and political will to deescalate tension. Civil society, with its flexibility and experience, can create opportunities to talk and engage in dialogue. Recent history vividly demonstrates the contributions of civil society including the GPPAC dialogue, the mediation role in US-Cuba academic dialogue, Russian-Christian dialogue of political experts, facilitation of the Christian-Muslim dialogue in Maluku, and between Serbian and Albanian communities.

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze positions of governments of the region on issues of regional peace and security. They are well known. However, for the purpose of this study one needs to examine the main civil society actors.

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**GPPAC**

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)\(^3\) is a member-led network of CSOs working for conflict prevention and peacebuilding across the world. It calls for a fundamental change in dealing with violent conflicts – a shift from reaction to prevention – that would avoid costly conflicts and save lives. Its goal is to promote a world where people and governments work to prevent violence and armed conflicts, leading to a world based on greater justice, sustainable development and human security.

GPPAC came about as a result of extensive consultations held in 2003-2004. It was officially launched at a global conference held in 2005 at the United Nations.

GPPAC is led by multi-actor collaboration and local ownership. It is organized around 15 regional networks of local organizations with each region having its own specific priority, character and agenda. Each region is represented in the International Steering Group (ISG), which determines joint global priorities and actions. The networks aim to achieve greater synergy in conflict prevention and peacebuilding by connecting and working at different levels (national, regional and global). At the local level, the networks strengthen the role of local civil society groups, especially in conflict or conflict-prone areas. At the regional level, the partnership facilitates greater network interaction and cooperation as well as regional and global exchanges to learn from each other’s experiences and develop joint strategies. GPPAC and its members maintain broad relations with other stakeholders at the international level, including the United Nations, regional intergovernmental organizations, state actors, the media, and academia.

GPPAC has four basic strategies:

1. Network strengthening and regional action;
2. Action learning;
3. Public outreach; and
4. Policy & advocacy.

Its strategic focus is led by the thematic priorities of preventive action, dialogue, mediation, peace education, and human security. Also it is committed to gender mainstreaming and integrating perspectives.

The Board of GPPAC Foundation and the Global Secretariat provide central leadership to the ISG. The Board consists of seven members who are appointed upon nomination by the ISG. Members of the Board serve for a period of three years, which can be renewed once. Its major donors and partners are the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Cordaid, the European Commission, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and of other states, and development support agencies. More detailed information about GPPAC and its activities can be found at [http://www.gppac.net/](http://www.gppac.net/).

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\(^3\) See the Charter and other relevant official and working documents of GPPAC at: [http://www.gppac.net/documents/130492842/0/GPPACCharter_November2013Updated.pdf/b0f82652-5bb2-42bc-99d5-9c3eac9a66d8](http://www.gppac.net/documents/130492842/0/GPPACCharter_November2013Updated.pdf/b0f82652-5bb2-42bc-99d5-9c3eac9a66d8)
The Global Secretariat of GPPAC is based in The Hague. It operates under the GPPAC Foundation and supports the work of the organization’s networks by facilitating and ensuring synergy and coherence of their activities.

**Regional challenges and action priorities**

Northeast Asia is a home to over one-quarter of the world’s population and a source of a number of potentially explosive armed conflicts based mainly on history and geography. Though the Cold War has ended in other parts of the world, bilateral alliances and Cold War mentality remain in the region. No movement has been made on the SPT since 2009. Therefore the following actions are necessary: forging and strengthening of cross-border ties between CSOs and promoting acceptable communication channels with governments that are not traditionally responsive to civil society initiatives in the field of peace and security. The functions of GPPAC/NEA Regional Secretariat are performed by Peace Boat, an international CSO based in Tokyo.

Bearing in mind the specifics of the region, GPPAC/NEA has the following action priorities:

- Resolution of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula;
- Support for an end to the political stalemate across the Taiwan Strait;
- Facilitation of dialogue regarding territorial disputes, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai islands, Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, Dokdo/Takeshima and more;
- Protection of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and spreading its ideals;
- Addressing the increasing militarism and nationalism in the region;
- Strengthening regional efforts for denuclearization;
- Fostering historical understanding and reconciliation with regard to events and war crimes during Japan’s period of imperialist aggression;
- Advocacy for sustainable development and a human security approach; and
- Promotion and implementation of peace education.

**Regional Steering Group**

The GPPAC/NEA Secretariat is the primary point of contact in the region for both regional network members and the broader GPPAC network. The Regional Steering Group (RSG) works to promote confidence, sharing of information, and joint planning and strategizing. RSG is comprised of focal points representing CSOs and experts in major cities of the member states. Thus the RSG includes focal points from Beijing, Hong Kong, Kyoto, Seoul, Shanghai, Taipei, Tokyo, Ulaanbaatar and Vladivostok. Pyongyang participates in the work of GPPAC/NEA as its partner. Representatives of PNND, Guangzhou, GPPAC Northamerica, American Friends

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4 For timeline of GPPAC/NEA major activities see Annex I.
5 For GPPAC/NEA Regional Action Agenda visit http://peaceboat.org/english/nwps/cn/arc/050204/naraan_gppac.pdf
6 Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Service Committee (US) and other international and regional organizations have attended RSG meetings.

RSG meetings are held annually at various locations rotating throughout the region. They provide an opportunity for its members to meet in person, exchange information, and discuss regional issues of peace, conflict prevention, security and disarmament. In 2015 the RSG assessed the results of the decade of its activities, its achievements and challenges, and strategized on GPPAC’s global and NEA regional activities for 2015-2020.

The GPPAC Global Secretariat, NEA Regional Secretariat, and Mongolian NGO Blue Banner are coordinating members as stated in the Framework document of UBP, adopted at the end of 2015. The members are responsible for strategic and program coordination of the process, its logistical management, resource mobilization, monitoring and evaluation, as well as communication. They are also responsible for mobilizing resources for the UBP, including for both specific activities and meetings, and the ongoing management of the process itself. Brief information about the two Secretariats have been provided above.

As to **Blue Banner**, it is an NGO established in 2005. Its mission is to promote the objectives of the peaceful, multi-pillar and balanced foreign policy of Mongolia that is conducive to creating an external environment free from any nuclear threat. This objective is to be attained by promoting clearer understanding of the country’s vital national interests, supporting or influencing the state policy, and promoting overall regional peace, security and mutual confidence. Hence its main activity is aimed at promoting nuclear non-proliferation in the region and the country’s initiative to turn Mongolia into a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). As an independent NGO, it does not receive any funding from Mongolian Government or its agencies. Inside the country it undertakes special area studies and presents its findings and recommendations to the general public and government agencies. It furthers disarmament education by disseminating information and organizing various events including round-table discussions on related issues. It also maintains extensive ties with regional and international NGOs working in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Other GPPAC/NEA focal points include:

**Beijing** – China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), a non-profit organization founded in 1992. By the end of 2010 it had 142 member organizations across China. It maintains close working relations with 272 foreign NGOs, bilateral, and multilateral organizations. It is an NGO with Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

**Hong Kong** - The Chinese Alliance for Commemoration of the Sino-Japanese War Victims (CACSJWV), founded in 1988. Its goal is to unite Chinese around the world as well as peace-loving people regardless of their nationalities. It collects material and makes researches on the suffering, casualties, and losses of Chinese people incurred by the Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945). It investigates war crimes, and raises people’s alert to Japan’s militarism.

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7 Information about the focal points is based on the data provided by these organizations
Kyoto – Nonviolent Peaceforce Japan (NPJ) was established to support Nonviolent Peaceforce (PF). It is part of the International Nonviolent Peaceforce established in India in 2002. NPJ organizes meetings, raises funds, and organizes workshops on nonviolence. It believes that nonviolent direct action and conflict resolution are not merely ideals but the most realistic and practical solutions.

Seoul – People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was established in 1994 and serves as a watchdog against abuse of power by governing and authority bodies. It raises public awareness through campaigning, monitoring, and bringing into public dialogue issues surrounding political activity.

Women Making Peace was founded in 1997 and is a specialized NGO and social movement that seeks to achieve reunification and peace on the Korean peninsula as well as promoting peaceful relations in the Asian region and worldwide. It also conducts research on the conditions and methods necessary for the peaceful reunification of Korea, and formulates policies towards achieving this goal from a feminist perspective.

Taipei – Peacetime Foundation (PTF) was founded for the purpose of understanding peace and non-violent means. It aims to establish relations with peace organizations and institutions around the world to promote the formation of a global peace and security network through multilateral alliances and cooperation.

Vladivostok - International Research Center, Maritime State University. It is one of the biggest maritime universities and a leading university of the Asia-Pacific region. It was established in 2001. The International Research Center collects and researches information on problematic elements of international security in the Asia Pacific Rim. It maintains working relations with research institutes of Japan, China, India, and the two Koreas.

Pyongyang – Korean National Peace Committee (KNPC) maintains partnership relations with GPPAC/NEA. It was founded in 1949 with the aim of contributing to achieving reunification and a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and building a new world, independent, peaceful and free from war, in accordance with the ideal of independence, friendship and peace.

Other international, regional and national NGOs participate in the works of GPPAC/NEA based on their interest and choosing.
**The role of Mongolia and its supportive foreign policy**

*Mongolia and its foreign policy*

Mongolia is a landlocked country situated in east-central Asia. It is bordered by Russia to the north and China to the south, east, and west. It has a territory of 1,564,116 square kilometers (603,909 square miles). It is the 19th largest in territory, making it the most sparsely populated country in the world with a population of three million. The country’s arable land is small and farming is quite limited. Much of its area is covered by steppes, with mountains to the north and west and the Gobi Desert to the south. Its wide steppe areas are fit for livestock raising. It has around 55 million head of livestock: sheep, goats, cows, horses, and camels.

Approximately 30 percent of the human population is nomadic or semi-nomadic. The predominant religion is Tibetan Buddhism. The majority of the state's citizens are of Mongol ethnicity. Kazakhs, Tuvans, and other minorities also live in the country, especially in its western part.

Mongolians are proud of their history, culture, and traditions. In 13th century, Genghis Khan established the largest empire in the history. The famous Silk Road that linked Asia with Europe, thrived under Mongol protection which contributed to broader trade relations and human contacts. In the 16th to 18th centuries the Mongolian empire gradually disintegrated, while Russia and China expanded their frontiers. Squeezed by the expanding Russian and Chinese empires, Mongolia gradually became part of the Manchu Empire. At the beginning of the 20th century Mongolia declared its independence. It struggled to have its independent status recognized by its neighbors and other great powers. In 1920s, it became part of the expanding Soviet empire. Though formally independent, it followed Soviet Union’s domestic social experimentation and foreign policy. In the 1950-60s, Mongolia sided with the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. Later Mongolia pursued its own national interests at home and abroad after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, and end of the Cold War in late 1980s.

Mongolia redefined its national interests, foreign policy goals and security objectives to respond to radical changes: both internal (democratization of the society) and external (the opening up to the world). Its foreign policy is no longer driven by ideology but rather by pragmatic calculations based on its own national interests and the promotion of common interests in the region ⁸. It strives to ensure its independence and sovereignty in the increasingly competitive world, expand its influence on the international arena, and secure its place in regional integration through an open and active foreign policy.

Mongolia’s foreign policy goals include prioritizing relations with China and Russia, diversifying relations by expanding relations with other states through its “third neighbor” policy, actively contributing to multilateral cooperation, and strengthening its position in Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia.

The country today maintains diplomatic relations with over 180 states, including all the states of Northeast Asia. Its active multilateral foreign policy at international fora is intended to translate its initiatives into soft power that would broaden its appeal and help promote its foreign

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policy. In September 2015, President Ts. Elbegdorj proposed to make Mongolia a permanent neutral country. This proposal reflects Mongolia’s foreign policy aims: promoting peace, mutual understanding, and cooperation. Currently legislation on the country’s permanent neutrality is being drafted by the State Great Hural (parliament) of Mongolia.

**East Asia policy**

One of the objectives of Mongolia’s foreign policy is to strengthen the country’s standing in East Asia by expanding its participation in the region’s political process and economic integration. Since the 1990s, it has joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia–Europe Meeting, and other regional and inter-regional fora. Currently land-locked Mongolia is working to join APEC. Membership in APEC will provide a platform to expand further and diversify Mongolia’s economic relationships, which are now dependent on its neighbors. It hopes that the 9th ASEM summit, to be held in July 2016 in Ulaanbaatar, will broaden its relations with the key countries of Asia and Europe and thus strengthen its position in the family of these nations.

Politically and economically, Mongolia is a part of East Asia, particularly Northeast Asia. The latter is a region, as mentioned earlier, where the the Cold War mentality persists. Mongolia maintains close relations with all the countries of the region, including the DPRK, that is seen by all nations as its comparative advantage. It feels the lack of a common regional security arrangement or mechanism hinders building confidence and resolving contentious issues, such as those on the Korean Peninsula and the territorial disputes in the East and South China seas, that can easily turn into a hotbed of conflict. Hence it believes that measures need to be taken to create the needed mechanism. As member of the region, it plays a positive role, provides practical ideas and could serve as an honest facilitator in Northeast Asia in cases where, in its view, it can make a difference. There are two main factors that enable that.

First, Mongolia does not have unresolved territorial or border issues with its neighbors and maintains good relations with all the countries of the region, including with the two Koreas. Second, as a relatively small country, it does not have its own narrow regional agenda. The Mongolian saying that “a duck is calm when the lake is calm” sums up Mongolia’s broader policy interests and considerations. Its interests are best served when the overall environment is stable and predictable.

Bearing the above in mind, in 2013 Mongolia’s President Ts. Elbegdorj launched the Ulaanbaatar Northeast Asian security dialogue initiative (UBD) aimed first and foremost at promoting confidence in the region. Unlike the currently stalled SPT, the President’s proposal is to start a dialogue on a semi-formal level. It does not address hard security issues but rather starts with issues on which a common understanding might comparatively easily be reached, such as economic cooperation, addressing common environmental challenges, non-traditional security threats, issues of regional stability, and military transparency. It believes that the process needs to be inclusive, and therefore it is important that the interests and views of all participants are treated equally. If need be, unofficial preliminary bilateral or trilateral meetings can be held in Ulaanbaatar, depending on the degree of trust and interest among the participants. In 2014 and 2015 Mongolia organized two international conferences to discuss the merits of the UBD. The discussions centered on how UBD can be shaped and promoted jointly with other processes and initiatives. The meetings were well attended and quite productive.

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9 For a background information about Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD) see annex II.
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status

Another focus of the country’s multilateral diplomacy is to contribute to regional nuclear security and non-proliferation. Thus in 1992 Mongolia declared itself a NWFZ and pledged to work to have that status “internationally guaranteed”. The initiative was directly connected with its geopolitical location as well as with the fact that during the Cold War it hosted military bases of a nuclear-weapon state. As a result it was targeted by two other nuclear-weapon states. Hence the declaration of its territory a single-State NWFZ is a rejection of the nuclear policies of the great powers, of nuclear proliferation as well as becoming once again a nuclear target state. At the same time, it was also a manifestation of the country’s desire for neutrality and non-involvement in nuclear power rivalries or strategic calculations as a pawn. In short, the declaration means that it would not allow the use of its territory to harm the vital interests of others nor be a catalyst for regional instability. This is especially important today with the growing concern of a possible nuclear arms race in the region. If Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (hereafter shortened to the status) is properly institutionalized, the country would be contributing some 1.5 million square kilometers of strategically located land to the world’s emerging nuclear-weapon-free area.

Since 1992 Mongolia has been working persistently to have the international community recognize the country’s unique status. It also sought credible security assurances from the five nuclear-weapon states (the P5). Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free policy has been widely recognized. Thus the UN General Assembly has adopted eight resolutions without a vote on the issue, in which it has welcomed the country’s policy and expressed support of its measures taken to consolidate and strengthen the status. Mongolia believes that to be more credible, the status needs to be clearly defined and accepted by the international community, especially by the UN General Assembly. However, the P5 are still reluctant to officially recognize Mongolia’s status as a form of NWFZ, believing that that might set a precedent and discourage states from establishing traditional (i.e. regional) zones. The past 24 years have witnessed emergence of three NWFZs in South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia, proving that the P5 apprehensions are baseless.

The negotiations between Mongolia and the P5 required nearly 90 meetings with P5 representatives, separately or with P2, P3 or P5 as a group. In September 2012 the P5 pledged in a joint declaration to respect that status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it. This pledge marks an important development in institutionalizing the status and making sure that no nuclear-weapon related threat would ever emanate from Mongolia’s territory and Mongolia itself would never be targeted with nuclear weapons. Based on the P5 joint declaration and in its spirit, Mongolia is working with member states of the United Nations, especially with the P5, to have the UN General Assembly officially recognize Mongolia’s unique status.

Mongolia’s current objective is to make sure that the purpose and substance of the status, especially its commitment and those of the P5, are well known to the world. It believes that the status would be truly viable and would contribute to regional predictability and confidence-building only if and when there is a clear understanding of its content and the means of maintaining and strengthening the status. This applies to the P5, to NWFZs, and the state parties to such zones. The first step in institutionalizing the status would be to work to properly to reflect the gist of the P5 joint declaration in a General Assembly resolution. This resolution will

10 For the timeline of the main events that lead to the P5 joint declaration see annex III.
11 See UNGA resolution A/RES/69/63 of December 2014 in annex IV.
12 See texts of P5 Joint Declaration and Mongolia’s declaration of 2012 in annexes V and VI.
be adopted hopefully in 2016, whereby the Assembly would unequivocally welcome the status as an important contribution to strengthening confidence and nuclear non-proliferation.

Mongolia believes that to be truly viable, the status needs to be properly institutionalized. At the national level that means identifying the agencies responsible for its operation, internal and international verification, external cooperation, and/or the exchange and providing of information. At the international level, the terms of reference of future cooperation need to be clearly defined with UN General Assembly, the IAEA, the five NWFZs, and other international bodies that deal with nuclear non-proliferation.

The next logical measure that Mongolia is undertaking is at the regional level, since all NWFZs are considered first and foremost effective regional measures of non-proliferation. To be effective and practically useful, Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status needs to play a positive and constructive role at the regional level, which should contribute to greater regional predictability and stability. With this in mind Mongolia, together with the Philippines, hosted an awareness raising and brainstorming ARF expert level meeting in September 2015. The workshop helped ARF experts to get closely acquainted with the history and state of Mongolia’s NWFS. In-depth discussions were held on how it could fit in the regional security structure and what role it can play. As the first non-traditional NWFZ, Mongolia’s experience has attracted much attention. ARF participants agreed to continue to address this issue in greater detail at its forthcoming meetings.

**NEA-NWFZ issue**

Mongolia witnessed over one quarter of the Soviet and Chinese atmospheric and underground nuclear tests in its vicinity. The environmental and health effects of these tests are yet to be fully assessed. In addition, having allowed the Soviet Union to establish military bases on its territory in 1960s to 1980s, some of which had dual-use aircraft and missiles, it was a target of preemptive or possible retaliatory nuclear strikes, with almost no voice of its own on the issue. Having sided firmly with the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute and having allowed the stationing of Soviet troops on its territory, Mongolia was not only a strategic buffer for the Soviets against China. In case of a conflict, it could also have served as a potential springboard from which the Soviets could launch a blitzkrieg-type military offensive into northern China. The archive documents reveal that had the Soviets attempted to use force against China (which they did in late 1960s) Mongolia would have been one of the first victims of a Sino-Soviet military confrontation.

Bearing the above in mind, Mongolia has been active in promoting the goals of peace, nuclear non-proliferation, and disarmament, including regional disarmament measures such as establishing regional NWFZs. Hence being part of Northeast Asia and physically part of Central Asia, it consistently supports the idea of establishing NWFZs in these two regions.

NWFZs are seen in Mongolia not only as security enhancing measures, which in themselves are important, but also as important confidence-building measures which are especially needed in Northeast Asia. It believes that practical cross recognition of states within Northeast Asian NWFZ would only strengthens regional peace and security. Along with this recognition of states, regional tension can be reduced by agreeing to dispose of nuclear weapons and acquiring security assurances from the nuclear powers.

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13 See Mongolia’s concept paper on the issue that has been circulated to ARF members in 2014 in annex VII.
The idea of establishing a NWFZ zone has been put forth by some states of the region during the Cold War but were rejected by others. That is why in 2013 President Ts. Elbegdorj at the High level meeting of the UN General Assembly devoted to nuclear disarmament pointed out that “as a country with first hand experience in ensuring security primarily by political and diplomatic means, Mongolia is prepared, on an informal basis, to work with the countries of Northeast Asia to see if and how a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be established in the region. Though we know well that that would not be easy and would require courage, political will and perseverance, it is doable, if not right away.”

Mongolia is working to raise awareness of the importance of establishing such a zone. Since no other Northeast Asian government is prepared to make or respond officially to such a call, the Mongolian non-governmental organization Blue Banner is raising the issue at regional and international fora. Thus it has co-organized side events on the issue of establishing NEA-NWFZ at 2014 NPT Prepcom and 2015 NPT Revcon. Together with its fellow GPPAC/NEA focal points, in 2014 Blue Banner organized in Ulaanbaatar an international conference entitled “Dimensions to create a Nuclear-Weapon Free Northeast Asia” which adopted a final document on the issues discussed.15

14 See annexes VIII and IX
15 See the materials at the following address:
http://peaceboat.org/english/content/documents/GPPAC%20NEA%20Nov%202015%20Conference%20papers.pdf
Preparations for the launching of UBP

Concrete preparations for launching the UBP were actively discussed since the deadlock of the SPT in 2009. Before moving forward with the UBP, GPPAC/NEA considered making use of the geopolitical location of Mongolia, its active foreign policy, maintaining of relations with all the states of the region and its vast experience in promoting the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status. The main issue was how to make use of Mongolia’s and Blue Banner’s comparative advantages and whether and to what degree the other regional focal points were prepared to support such a process, and whether Pyongyang representatives would join the process as a participant. This issue was specifically considered at the RSG meeting held in November 2014. To prepare a suitable atmosphere to consider the issue, the participants first shared their vision of how they hoped to see Northeast Asia in fifty years. Mindful of their visions, the participants broke into small groups to exchange views and discuss how UBP, as an effective regional Track-2 dialogue mechanism, can help achieve that vision. Each group was given questions to consider the goals, format and agenda. Then the plenary meeting considered the outcomes of group discussions. At that meeting it was agreed to launch the UBP in 2015. During that meeting the participants finally agreed on its basic guidelines document that would include the objectives, governing principles, priority thematic areas, expected impact, engagement and target groups, core activities, funding, monitoring and evaluation, and some other issues. Bearing in mind that Mongolian government-sponsored UBD would be holding its first conference in June 2015, it was decided to launch the UBP just prior to that conference so as to enable UBP participants to participate in the UBD conference and consider ways and means to work with the latter.

The participants of the meeting were received by Mr. Purevsuren Lundeg, Security and Foreign Policy advisor of the President of Mongolia (who later was appointed as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mongolia). He welcomed the launch of the UBP and expressed the hope that it would work closely with UBD.

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16 See the report on consideration of this issue at: https://usmg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/b/message?search=1&s=zRdeiprlTxP&encryptQ=1&startMid=406&sort=date&order=down&mid=1_0 &AEqti2IAABEyYVG24QXcAMReOAs&fid=Inbox&rand=1874002017&enc=auto &cmd=msg.scan&pid=2&uf=fn=GPPAC_NEA_2014_MEETING_REPORTsmall.pdf

17 The Mongolian government has from the very outset supported GPPAC by supporting the hosting of GPPAC/NEA meetings in Ulaanbaatar in 2007, 2010 and 2014.
Launching of the UBP

UBP was launched on 23 June 2015. The meeting was attended by focal points and activists from China, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the United States of America, and Mongolia. During that meeting, as agreed, the participants had open and frank discussion on the situation in Northeast Asia and the role that civil society can and should play in addressing the common challenges. Against this background they discussed and finalized the basic document - UBP Framework document.\textsuperscript{18} The second meeting of UBP is scheduled for 2016.

\textsuperscript{18} For the text of UBP Framework document see annex X.
Looking to the future

The UBP is less than a year old. Therefore, it is too early to consider the challenges that UBP might face. Time will show the degree of support and the challenges that it might encounter. Since UBP is an organic part of GPPAC/NEA, the author would suggest UBP consider the following ideas:

- Mindful of the political atmosphere at the national and regional levels, one should make sure to underline what UBP is **NOT**. It is not a governmental decision-making body. It does not try to compete with other peace and disarmament promoting NGOs or think tanks. Its role is complementary, based on its comparative advantages. UBP’s main objectives are to provide space and a venue for GPPAC/NEA members and their CSO partners, share information and their experiences based on its closeness to the grass roots, and further cooperation with like-minded CSOs and the broad GPPAC network. Such an attitude would remove any doubts for other stakeholders.

- Since UBP is not a national or international decision-making body, its activities should be more process-oriented. Its own activities can create the conditions for it to take appropriate decisions at its own level that could lead to proposals and decisions to reduce tension and develop cooperation.

- Critical self-assessment is important for effective management and efficient results. One should start with each focal point assessing its own strengths and weaknesses and work to maximize its comparative advantage and minimize the weaknesses. Thus it is important to critically assess its standing and input of its services at the national level and in the specific area of its activity, especially in awareness-raising, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. The same needs to be done with regards to its regional activities and practical input. One should also assess how effectively it is in making use of the vast GPPAC arsenal, networks, national media, and the Peace Portal.

- The meetings of UBP need to be more structured so as to make the most use of such occasions. Thus it would be practically useful if members dedicate more time and efforts to prepare for the meetings. Good preparation leads to a more productive and successful outcome. It is usually helpful when national level meetings are held in preparation for such meetings since they would provide useful material and ideas that could later be shared at the UBP meetings with fellow members and other participants, as well as informing the participants of the concrete follow-up measures undertaken since the previous UBP meeting.

- Effectiveness of the meetings are also related to pre-meeting materials. It would be useful if focal points would send, one month prior to the meeting, a one-page summary regarding the presentations to be made and ideas put forth for discussion (since English is not mother tongue for most of the participants, it would be useful to get prior written information and have time to review, prepare follow-up questions, flag some ideas, etc.).

- Final documents of the meetings should be, in my view, more focused and not of general nature, and indicate what UBP members intend to do. These final documents are barometers of the common views on issues discussed at the meeting and not stale, well-known positions. I do not think that they will attract national or regional attention unless they contain important ideas of substance or procedure. National and regional press will
not carry news about outcomes unless there is something new, fresh or thought provoking.

- UBP, like other international meetings need to be announced in advance to the media to draw attention. UBP members are encouraged to meet members of the press and provide them with material on the UBP and the issues to be discussed. It is not an easy task, but one needs to make use of the media and to the extent possible, social networking as well. Even communicating the results of small actions can be useful for outcome and follow-up measures.

- Bear in mind the agenda, it is always useful if one of the members brings an opinion leader, who is an eminent person or expert, to be a keynote speaker either at the meeting or at some special event. The financial aspects of such invitations should be arranged beforehand with the Coordinating members. In any case, if the meeting is held in Ulaanbaatar, Blue Banner could invite speakers from amongst Mongolian scholars or experts (please see the serial provisions on visibility for other ideas of UBP Framework document).

- One of the comparative advantages of UBP is GPPAC/NEA’s partner relationship with DPRK’s Korean National Peace Committee (KNPC). This relationship should be maintained, supported, and further developed since UBP provides not only venue but also space for unofficial discussion of the issues relating to the Korean peninsula. In this sense perhaps one of the future UBP meetings could invite an official from the DPRK to address this regional issue. Blue Banner can raise the issue with Mongolia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if the other members agree.

- One of the reasons why Ulaanbaatar was designated as a venue for civil society support for the SPT and dialogue for peace on the Korean peninsula is the country’s good relations with all the states of the SPT and its vast experience in promoting Mongolia’s status. Sharing Mongolia’s experience in addressing security-related issues primarily by political and diplomatic means and its innovative, out-of-box approach to seemingly insurmountable obstacles could be inspiring for other states and CSOs. Hence in 2017, when the country will mark 25 years of its initiative to turn the country into a single-State NWFZ, UBP could have a special session or event to share Mongolia’s experience and lessons in addressing issues of national and regional security and cooperation.

- Due to the DPRK’s recent nuclear and missile tests and the latest UN Security Council sanctions resolution on the issue, official and semi-official channels of communication are extremely restricted. Hence there is little hope for official moves to resume the SPT, at least until after the US presidential election in 2016. In the meantime there is no guarantee that the sides directly involved can avoid actions that may further aggravate the situation. Hence, mindful of UBP’s comparative advantage of KNPC participation, it should encourage the US, DPRK, and ROK through un-official contacts to suspend, if not freeze, the provocative moves on all sides. A move from civil society may be welcomed by all sides. As the saying goes, “nothing ventured, nothing gained”.

- Last but not least, an important issue that must be addressed is fundraising. In this open and interconnected world, fundraising is gradually becoming more results-based and results-oriented. The more active and relevant CSO activities are perceived, the better chance there is for raising funds. Funding and supporting CSOs at the national level should be an important part of UBP activities. Making wider use of the press and media
by all members, and involving volunteers, both youth and experts, is strongly encouraged.
Briefly about the author

Dr. ENKHSAIKHAN is Mongolian. He is an international lawyer. As a former diplomat he represented Mongolia in Austria and at the United Nations in New York. He also served as the foreign policy and legal advisor to the first democratically elected President of Mongolia and as the Executive Secretary of the country’s National Security Council. In these roles he coordinated the drafting of Mongolia’s first national security and foreign policy concepts and the basis of its military doctrine.

He authored a book on Mongolia’s nuclear security challenges and translated a number of democracy-related books into Mongolian. He is also the author of nearly 100 articles on international relations, non-proliferation and regional security issues. He organized or participated in many regional meetings and workshops aimed at promoting regional peace, stability, and cooperation. He is the Chairman of Blue Banner, a Mongolian NGO dedicated to promoting nuclear non-proliferation and Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.
Suggested reading:

General publications:


Processes of Community Change and Social Action. Allen M. Omoto Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004


GPPAC publications:

Creating Spaces for Dialogue - A Role for Civil Society. GPPAC Dialogue and Mediation Series. Issue # 1, 2015


Filling the Gap: How civil society engagement can help the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture meet its purpose. By Camilla Campisi and Laura Ribeiro Rodrigues Pereira. April 2015

Timeline of GPPAC/NEA major activities

2005 - Launch of GPPAC Northeast Asia at the UN University in Tokyo
- GPPAC Global Conference at the UN Headquarters in New York
2006 - Regional meeting at Mt. Kumgang, close to DMZ in DPRK and launch of Regional Work Plan
2007 - Civil Society Six-Party Talks for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia in Ulaanbaatar
- Inaugural GPPAC Asia Pacific Forum onboard of Peace Boat
2008 - Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War, Regional Steering Group and Asia Pacific Forum in Japan
2009 - Regional Steering Group meeting in Seoul, in conjunction with the International Conference against the Asia Pacific Missile Defence and for the End of Arms Race
2010 - International Conference “Eliminating Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia” and Regional Steering Group Meeting in Ulaanbaatar
2011 - Regional Steering Group Meeting in Beijing
- First Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI) summer training course held in Seoul and the DMZ
2012 - Regional Steering Group Meeting and academic conference on territorial issues in Vladivostok
- NARPI summer training course held in Hiroshima
2013 - Regional Steering Group Meeting and International Dialogue
- Conference on “Seeking Peace from Oceanic Perspectives” in Taipei
- NARPI summer training course held in Seoul
2014 - International Conference on “Dimensions to create a Nuclear-Weapon-Free NEA”, Regional Steering Group Meeting and preparatory meeting for Ulaanbaatar Process (UBP) in Ulaanbaatar
- NARPI summer training course held in Nanjing
2015 - Launching of GPPAC Ulaanbaatar Process (UBP) and considering other regional cooperation issues. The participants of the UBP also participated in the work of the International Conference on Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security
- NARPI summer training course held in Ulaanbaatar
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ULAANBAATAR DIALOUGE

Despite often being labeled as one of the most complex places in the world, our region holds a great deal of potential. As Asia becomes the engine of the world economic development, Northeast Asia has huge potential for shared prosperity.

However, we must also bear in mind that the situation in our home region remains delicate. Circumstances on the Korean peninsula disrupt regional integration efforts and negatively affect long-term stability. Additionally, there remains vexing historical and territorial disputes between nations.

These issues have a profound impact on Mongolia. As an integral part of Northeast Asia, Mongolia prioritizes these regional concerns. It remains one of our top foreign policy objectives to not only develop and strengthen ties with our neighbors, but also to constructively contribute our share to the common well-being and security of the region. Today, more than ever, it has become imperative to resolve the misunderstandings and disputes in our region through dialogue and discussion.

ULAANBAATAR DIALOUGE HISTORY

The Mongolian saying “A duck is calm when the lake is calm” sums up Mongolia’s broader foreign policy considerations in Northeast Asia - that is, Mongolia’s interests are best served when the regional security environment is stable.

Mongolia first proposed the idea of creating a regional security dialogue in Northeast Asia in the early 1980’s. At that time, Mongolia called for an all-Asian convention prohibiting the use of force to prevent conflicts. In 2000, Mongolia started studying the possibility of a new official dialogue which led to a conference under the theme “Security Perspectives of Central and Northeast Asia: Ulaanbaatar as a New Helsinki” organized by the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies in 2008.

Conceived by The President of Mongolia, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asia Security Initiative (UBD) was publicly announced during the VII Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracy in Ulaanbaatar on April 29, 2013.

WHY ULAANBAATAR?

Having accumulated experience in organizing multilateral events, Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia, is an emerging international venue for conferences, and will host the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on September 15-18, 2015 and the 11th ASEM Summit in 2016.

• Mongolia is uniquely positioned in the region to facilitate the economic integration, development of common infrastructure, use of energy resources, protection of environment and cooperation in fighting transnational crime.

• Thus, Ulaanbaatar can serve as a neutral meeting ground, literally and metaphorically, as Northeast Asia’s Geneva and can be a multilateral venue for regional security dialogue.
WHY DIALOGUE?

Dialogue is an exchange of ideas directed towards the exploration of a particular subject or the resolution of a problem with a view to reach an amicable agreement through series of discussions. It is considered to be the best way to tackle problems and build confidence between conflicting nations.

Demand for more active engagement and mutual trust in the region is constantly growing while the Six-party talks, the main dialogue mechanism in NEA, is yet to resume.

The importance of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue lies in the implementation of a dialogue mechanism in NEA. The initiative, however, has no intention to compete or substitute the SPT.

Why is a dialogue necessary for NEA security?

- It builds mutual understanding and trust between parties through open talks.
- It is an inclusive process which brings together the voices of Government officials, academics and civil society to address common challenges.
- It can help prevent conflicts from arising and facilitate lasting comprehensive settlements for existing conflicts.

UBD OVERALL GOAL & UBD PRINCIPLES

We invite our regional partners to engage in the dialogue and to debate region-wide issues of common interest. Mongolia understands that the ties that bind us can serve in the cause of peace building and stability on the Peninsula as well as in the region.

To reach its goals, UBD prioritizes common interests, mutual respects, mutual trust, multilateral talks, and openness and transparency as our main principles.

UBD PARTIES

Mongolia, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America are the major partners of the initiative. Other parties from international organizations as well as non-regional countries are always welcome to participate in the process.

UBD FORMS

Recognizing that Track 1 discussions are official, wherein diplomats and government delegates usually express and justify their official positions, the UBD is designed to focus mainly on Track 1.5 and Track 2 efforts, since UBD intends to avoid overlapping or competing with other forms of dialogues.

Track 1.5 and Track 2 channels are the most effective instruments for promoting mutual understanding. Officials and politicians get together with academics and talk about security issues under the Chatham House rule which contribute to mutual understanding and greater confidence.

The outcome of UBD should be formal and practical security cooperation and consultation.
UBD PRIORITY AREAS

Every region faces a myriad of distinct problems and those of Northeast Asia that the UB Dialogue is designed to resolve or mitigate are those that affect regional stability. To that end, this forum seeks to enhance security and cooperation in the following fields:

ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE PAST

Under the auspices of the Dialogue, Mongolia has organized the following initiatives:

"ROLE OF WOMEN PARLIAMENTARIANS IN PROMOTING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EDUCATION" - November 25, 2013

Female parliament members from Mongolia, Russia, China, DPRK and ROK participated in this meeting, representing their countries. The unique purpose of this meeting was to gather regional representatives and conduct discussions concerning peace and development of NEA. Furthermore, it was the first regional forum focused on the role of female parliamentarians.

“ULAANBAATAR DIALOGUE ON NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY”
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE June 17-18, 2014

Mongolia hosted the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” International Conference with the participation of more than 35 representatives from Mongolia, Russia, China, Japan, DPRK, ROK, the USA, Germany and the Netherlands.

“SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE CITIES” NORTHEAST ASIAN MAYORS FORUM
August 18-19, 2014

About 120 delegates from cities across Northeast Asia participated in this regional conference. This initiative not only expanded the existing cooperation between the nations but also created new areas for cultural, industrial, economic and agricultural development.

THE CONFERENCE ON NORTHEAST ASIAN “ENERGY CONNECTIVITY” March 17-18, 2015

Operating under the framework of a dialogue, the Mongolian Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), Institute of Energy and Economy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly initiated and organized an international conference entitled ‘Energy Connectivity’. Delegates from six Northeast Asian countries participated and shared their opinions on creating energy connectivity in the region.

“NORTHEAST ASIAN YOUTH SYMPOSIUM FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION” IN CONJUNCTION WITH MONGOLIAN YOUTH FEDERATION - May 20, 2015

Northeast Asian Youth Symposium: Ulaanbaatar Dialogue was organized by the Mongolian Youth Federation in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Studies. Delegates from Mongolia, Russia, China, Japan, ROK and the USA shared their respective views on the importance of UBD in building confidence in NEA and youth participation in the regional cooperation as they drafted the declaration of Northeast Asian Youth Symposium calling for NEA Governments engagement with youth in regional stability and cooperation.
NWFS milestones

1992 – new independent foreign policy is announced. Soviet/Russian troop pull-out is completed. Mongolia declares its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

1993 – Friendly relations treaty is signed with the Russian Federation in which Russia pledges to respect Mongolia’s policy of not admitting the deployment on and transit through its territory of foreign troops, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

1993 – US, UK and China issue statements of welcome and support for Mongolia’s policy.

1994 – France expresses support for Mongolia’s policy.

1995 – 1998 Mongolia holds talks with the five nuclear-weapon states (the P5) to have them recognize Mongolia’s single-State NWFZ. As a result of negotiation, the P5 agree to recognize Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

1998 – UN General Assembly adopts resolution 53/77D entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” and decides to inscribe the item on its agenda and considered it every second year.

1999 – Russia proposes to provide appropriate security assurances to Mongolia

2000 – Mongolia’s State Great Hural (parliament) adopts Law on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

2000 - P5 make a joint statement providing negative and positive security assurances to Mongolia.

2001 – P5 and Mongolia meet in Sapporo, Japan to discuss Mongolia’s status and how to strengthen it.

2002 – Mongolia proposes to Russia and China draft elements of a possible trilateral treaty regarding Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

2007 – Mongolia proposes to Russia and China a draft trilateral treaty regarding its status and a protocol that could be signed by US, UK and France.

2009 – Mongolia holds two rounds of consultative meetings in Geneva with Russia and China regarding the draft trilateral treaty and the protocol. Russia and China declare that the other three nuclear-weapon states must be involved in the consultations and discussions.

2011 – Mongolia resumes consultations with the P5 on further steps to promote its status.

2012 – Mongolia and the P5 sign parallel declarations regarding its nuclear-weapon-free status. In their joint declaration the P5 pledge to respect the status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it.


2014 – The Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement declares support for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status as well as its policy aimed at institutionalizing that status.

2015 – ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) expert-level workshop entitled “Promoting a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia” is held to consider the ways and means of promoting a better understanding of non-traditional NWFZs, using Mongolia’s experience as a case study.
The purpose of this document is to provide a conceptual framework for the planning and conduct of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) workshop on promoting Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status within the ISM on NPD

**Background**

1. **Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status** (NWFS)
   Mongolia is located between two nuclear-weapon states. Throughout the second half of the XX century, especially during the Cold War, it was allied with one of them and hosted its military bases. As such, it was hostage to the tense relations between the two neighbors and, at the height of their dispute, could have easily been drawn into their conflict. Hence in September 1992, when the last Russian troops were being withdrawn from the country, Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear weapon-free zone. When making the declaration, Mongolia was aware of the 1975 United Nations comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) that suggested that even ‘individual’ states could establish such zones. The objective of the initiative was to ban stationing of nuclear weapons or parts of such weapons system on the Mongolian territory and acquire security assurances from the five nuclear-weapon states (P5).

2. **Conducive environment.** In early 1990s, with the normalization of Sino-Russian relations and the virtual end of the Cold War, the external environment has undergone fundamental changed. The two neighbors have agreed not to use territories and airspace of neighboring third countries against each other. That served as the favorable external condition for Mongolia’s initiative. Internally, Mongolia introduced basic political and economic reforms. In foreign policy, it discarded the ideologically driven policy and reliance on one state or a group of states and, instead, has put its own national interests and those of the international community as the basis of its foreign policy. Instead of relying on an alliance with one great power for its security, Mongolia has opted to ensure its security primarily by political and diplomatic means based on the imperatives of common security and to that end to promote a ‘third neighbor’ policy.

   It is in this spirit, and bearing in mind its Cold War era experience, including witnessing over 25 percent of nuclear weapon tests on its doorsteps and the risk of being drawn into possible conflict of its nuclear-armed neighbors, in 1992 the President of Mongolia has declared from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly the country a NWFZ and to have that status internationally guaranteed. Mongolia’s initiative was welcomed by the international community as contributing to regional stability and confidence-building.

3. **Challenge to the initiative.** However, the challenge in materializing the initiative was connected with its geo-political location since it could not form part of any regional (traditional) NWFZ that could be established in the region. Though the P5 recognized Mongolia as a ‘unique case’, they have been and still are hesitant to acknowledge it as a
single-State NWFZ since, in their view, that might set a precedent that could discourage others from establishing traditional NWFZs.

**Policy to overcome the challenge.** Despite the above challenge, in the past two decades Mongolia worked persistently with the P5 and other states, as a result of which its nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS) has received wide international recognition and support. Hence, in 2000 the P5 have provided Mongolia with apolitical assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. Further talks with the P5 resulted in 2012 in signing of parallel Mongolian and the P5 joint declarations, whereby Mongolia pledged not to station nuclear weapons on its territory, while the P5- to respect its unique status and not to contribute to any act that would violate that status.

Mongolia welcomed the 2012 P5 joint declaration as an important commitment tailored to its geo-political location and to its security needs. When providing the assurances, however the P5 have pointed out that they would have difficulties in providing legally based assurances since that would set a precedent and upset the present practice.

**The essence of Mongolia’s status policy.** Mongolia is pursuing at present three distinct aims: 1) ensure its own nuclear security; 2) contribute to the common efforts to promote greater transparency and confidence-building in the region; and 3) contribute in general to nuclear non-proliferation. In 2000, following Mongolia’s adoption of its legislation, the P5 have made, as mentioned above, a joint statement providing it with negative and positive political security assurances. Mongolia welcomed the joint statement as an important step in institutionalizing the status. At the same time, it has indicated that to be properly institutionalized, the status needed to have legally-binding assurances and that, bearing in mind Mongolia’s location, the assurance need not be generic or broad, but Mongolia-specific and practically useful. In Mongolia’s case it meant that the P5 officially recognize the status and refrain from acts that would violate it. As a result of talks and joint efforts, in 2012 the P5 and Mongolia have signed parallel declarations defining the status. Mongolia confirmed its pledge not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory. The P5 in their joint declaration have taken note of Mongolia’s legislation, pledged, as agreed, to respect the status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it.

Today Mongolia’s status is part and parcel of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Like in the case of traditional NWFZs, its obligations go further than the NPT commitments. Bearing in mind the developments in some other parts of the world, Mongolia’s commitment is not limited only to prohibiting stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory. It would prohibit placing on its territory of nuclear-weapon-related support facilities (including communication, surveillance and intelligence-gathering facilities as well as air navigational installations designed to serve nuclear strategic systems). This is important since the current trend among the nuclear-weapon states is still to modernize their nuclear forces, develop and deploy new types of nuclear weapons or missiles in line with their policies of enhancing survivability of their nuclear weapons, their ability to penetrate missile defenses, introducing new generations of missiles or developing military technology to counter such weapons or systems. Their nuclear concepts and policies still do not preclude the use or threat of use of such weapons.

**2. Present state of the status and the next step.** In 2000 Mongolia has adopted a legislation that defined the status at the national level and criminalized acts that would violate it. In 2006 and 2014 it has reviewed its implementation and submitted reports thereon to the State Great Hural (parliament).
At the international level, the UN General Assembly in its resolution 53/77 D in 1998 entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” has welcomed the initiative and has since been considering every second year an item with similar title. Mongolia believes that its nuclear-weapon-free status will be viable and contribute to regional peace and security, like traditional NWFZs, when it is accepted and gradually integrated in the regional cooperative security arrangement or structure.

3. **ARF factor.** The ARF was designed to foster constructive dialogue and consultations on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and make significant contributions to confidence-building and conflict prevention in the APR. Today the ARF is recognized as one of the important regional fora and a significant dialogue mechanism to promote confidence and create a more favorable security environment in the region. That is why Mongolia has hosted a number of meetings related to issues under consideration by the ARF.

Mongolia believes that while the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NWFZs play and shall play an increasingly important role as interim measures in promoting the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

Due to its diverse membership, the ARF is an ideal forum where non-proliferation and disarmament issues could be considered, if not negotiated, since almost one third of its membership are parties to the Bangkok or Rarotonga NWFZ treaties. On the other hand, some non-nuclear-weapon states might not be able to join these zones due to political or geographical considerations. A prime example of such a case is Mongolia. Also ARF membership includes three recognized and three *de facto* nuclear-weapon states, while other three nuclear capable states are under extended nuclear umbrella.

4. **ARF involvement.** ARF has been supportive of Mongolia’s initiative since 1999. Thus in 2002, i.e. three years after Mongolia’s ARF membership, the Forum has expressed support for Mongolia’s policy. In August of this year, the Forum welcomed Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including the 2012 P5 joint declaration regarding that status, as a concrete contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and promoting confidence and predictability in the region. On its part, the Mongolian participants of ARF meetings have regularly been updating the participants of the measures taken to promote the status and institutionalize it at the international level.

5. **Aim.** The workshop is intended to contribute to understanding the non-traditional cases in establishing NWFZs and how they need to be approached, taking Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status as a case study, and to see if or how such experience could be useful in other non-traditional cases.

6. **Objectives of the workshop are to:**
   - organize an in-depth discussion of issues connected with establishing NWFZs in non-traditional circumstances (i.e. geographical, political or legal reasons that can impede States to join the existing zones or establishing new zones)
   - identify issues that need to be addressed to facilitate the establishment of NWFZ regimes in non-traditional circumstances
   - provide capacity building for participants of states that are not parties to NWFZs but are developing interest in establishing or joining such zones.

7. **Theme/Topics.** The overarching theme of the workshop could be “Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status: the regional dimension” with the following topics for discussion:
8. **Participants.** Mongolia invites all ARF member states as well observer states and international organizations to send expert-level representatives that deal with non-proliferation, disarmament and regional security issues.

9. **Time/Venue/Working Language.** The workshop is expected to be held at the end of August or the first week of September 2015 in Ulaanbaatar. The working language will be English.

10. **Administrative Arrangements.** Mongolia is prepared to co-chair and co-sponsor the workshop either with the Chair of ASEAN or other interested ASEAN member state. Mongolia will meet the local administrative costs of the workshop. International travel, accommodation and other related costs will be the responsibility of the participants. The workshop will be held for 2 days, including a half day site visit or other relevant excursion. The program would have the following 5 plenary sessions: an opening session, three working sessions and a closing session. The working sessions will have short briefings and discussion of issues of the agenda based on the focused discussion questions to be formulated and summing of the results of the meeting. The closing plenary would highlight the key ideas and observations emerging from the workshop. Depending on the discussions, the workshop would identify the experiences, lessons learned as well as ways to strengthen regional cooperation in promoting non-proliferation and disarmament.

Three weeks prior to the workshop, the participants will be provided with the agenda, annotated agenda, background information on the issues to be discussed and a list of questions that would enable meetings to focus on the agenda issues.

Ulaanbaatar, 14 August 2014
Joint Statement for the Promotion of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia

A new environment for moving forward the denuclearization of Northeast Asia is now emerging. In July 2013, the report of the UN Secretary General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters made a recommendation that “the Secretary-General consider appropriate action for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North-East Asia.” Also at the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013, President Elbegdorj Tsakhia of Mongolia announced the country's readiness to work, on an unofficial basis, with the countries of the region to see if and how a NWFZ could be established in Northeast Asia.

Meanwhile, the possible consequences of detonation of nuclear weapons show their inhumanity that can threaten the very survival of the human species. Hence the two thirds of UN member states have supported the General Assembly resolution to that effect that had been adopted in October 2013. Japan, a country which had experienced the horrors of the atomic bombings during wartime, also supported the resolution.

Since 2003, a group of like-minded NGOs from Japan, the ROK and Mongolia have convened various meetings on the issue of a NEA-NWFZ in the belief that a NEA-NWFZ could greatly contribute to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The voice of the civil society, the local authorities, the religious community and members of parliamentarian that call for establishing a NEA-NWFZ are increasing the region. Thus 543 mayors in Japan have signed on to a statement in support of establishing a NEA-NWFZ.

Bearing the above in mind, the NGOs from Japan, the ROK, Mongolia and their supporters have organized an NGO forum entitled “Time for Action to Establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” on the margins of the 3rd NPT Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN Headquarters in New York on 30 April 2014 so as to directly convey their strong conviction for the need to start discussing the possibility of establishing a NEA-NWFZ. The forum heard reports and views of diverse representatives of Northeast Asia, including experts, local authorities, religious leaders, parliamentarians and citizens' peace organizations, and agreed on a comprehensive approach to the issue that should include shifting from the current Korean War armistice agreement to a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

In order to realize a world free of nuclear weapons, it is the responsibility of all countries of the world to pursue a shift away from security policies based on the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Like in other regions of the world, establishing a NEA-NWFZ could form the basis for such a security policy. Such a policy could also complement the efforts of the governments of the region to address the issues within the framework of the Six-Party Talks.

We, the participants of this NGO forum strongly support the efforts to start discussing on an informal basis the possibility of establishing a NEA-NWFZ and declare our commitment to continue to work together in this endeavor. We call on politicians involved in local and national politics around the world, civil society groups, and individuals to express their support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone, and work together for its realization.
Organizers of the NGO Forum “Time for Action to Establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone”:

Blue Banner
Peace Boat
Peace Depot
Peace Network
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
International Peace Bureau
Nautilus Institute
Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Religions for Peace
World Council of Churches
Joint Statement for the Creation of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

It is approaching 70 years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and yet humankind still does not possess a legally binding framework to ban the worst man-made inhumane weapons. Believing that it would contribute greatly to global efforts for a nuclear free world, our group of NGOs from Japan, Korea and Mongolia has since 2003 continued to hold workshops at the NPT Review Conferences and in other settings to call for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ). In Northeast Asia, initiatives calling for such a zone are being undertaken by various sectors of society, including local municipalities, religious community, national parliamentarians and more. For example, in Japan, 546 heads of local municipalities have signed a petition in support of a NEA-NWFZ as at March 2015.

Based on this, NGOs from Japan, Korea and Mongolia, in cooperation with international peace groups, held the workshop “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Contributes towards Global Nuclear Zero” at the UN Headquarters in New York during the 9th NPT Review Conference. Here, we aimed to directly deliver the dedicated conviction of civil society to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and delegations of various countries. To this end, we reported on the various initiatives of experts, local municipalities, the religious community, national parliamentarians and NGOs in the region, and discussed the importance of a comprehensive approach including the promotion of a NEA-NWFZ and a treaty to end the Korean War.

In order to realize a nuclear weapon free world, all countries have the responsibility to pursue a shift to security policies which do not rely on nuclear weapons, Mongolia’s policy of nuclear-weapon-free status being one such example. A NEA-NWFZ provides this path for Japan, Korea and related countries in Northeast Asia. This is an effective means to break through the severe situation in Northeast Asia and work for lasting peace in the region. In July 2013, the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters made the ground-breaking recommendation that “the Secretary General should also consider appropriate action for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North-East Asia.” Furthermore, at the UN High Level Meeting on nuclear disarmament in September 2013, Mongolia's President Elbegdorj declared that as a country with first-hand experience in ensuring security primarily by political and diplomatic means, Mongolia is prepared, on an informal basis, to work with the countries of Northeast Asia to see if and how a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be established in the region.

We strongly appeal to the UNODA to take concrete steps according to the Advisory Board's recommendations for “appropriate action for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North-East Asia,” and for the member states of the Six Party Talks and related governments to cooperate in these efforts. We strongly support such moves, and will work to build international public opinion and cooperate. We also call upon politicians involved in national and local politics, civil society and individuals around the world to support a NEA-NWFZ, and to join efforts for its realization.

April 30, 2015
New York, USA
Organizers of the NGO Workshop “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Contributes towards Global Nuclear Zero: Pursuing a shift of security policy on nuclear weapons”

Blue Banner
Peace Boat
Peace Depot
Peace Network
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

International Peace Bureau
Nautilus Institute
Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Religions for Peace
World Council of Churches
Ulaanbaatar Process

A Civil Society Dialogue for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia

FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

Section 1. Background

1.1 The Northeast Asia region remains characterised by Cold War era political interactions. The region is, at times, charged with fierce rhetoric amid fears of military escalation, and lacks institutional mechanisms for peace and security. The Korean Peninsula remains in an arms race system, without a peace treaty to end the Korean War. The absence of sustained dialogue and repeated military aggressions have heightened tensions within the Korean Peninsula and across the region.

1.2 Launched in 2003, the Six Party Talks involve China, the DPRK, the ROK, Russia, Japan and the US. The Talks are the closest alternative to an institutional mechanism for regional peace and security, and have been the best available tool for peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue in Northeast Asia. Various rounds have achieved some results, demonstrating that progress in regional engagement is possible. Yet, the suspension of the Talks since 2009 and increasing calls for a hard-line response have left little room for the resumption of dialogue on a governmental level.

1.3 Inflammatory rhetoric and the escalation of several territorial disputes in the region emphasize the need to maintain space for dialogue and build trust and confidence between all parties. In order to move towards realizing regional peace and stability, it is imperative to revitalize dialogue processes on wide-ranging issues, including the Six Party Talks, based on mutual trust and confidence among all parties.

1.4 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and of the division of the Korean Peninsula. This serves as a reminder of the urgency of resolution of issues facing the region, and the importance of frank and open dialogue and mutual respect. In a Northeast Asia that has not yet fully come to terms with its turbulent history, civil society can pave the way in opening channels for sustained engagement, cooperation and region-wide confidence building.

Section 2. Introduction

2.1 As a worldwide alliance of civil society organizations structured around 15 regional networks, based on a network approach of information exchange and sharing of experiences, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is well placed to convene and facilitate the Ulaanbaatar Process. Dialogue and Mediation is a key priority of GPPAC, supported by a working group comprised of representatives from nine regions, including Northeast Asia. With extensive practical experience in facilitating such processes, this group seeks to promote and enhance dialogue and mediation practices and processes in the region, by generating knowledge, exchanging experiences and co-operating cross-regionally.

2.2 The concept for such a civil society dialogue process was first proposed by GPPAC Northeast Asia in the Regional Action Agenda adopted at the network’s launch in Tokyo on February 2, 2005. Building upon the regional network developed in the following years, the Ulaanbaatar Process was officially launched in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia on June 23-24, 2015. This was immediately prior to the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security International Conference organized by the Mongolian Government / Institute for Strategic Studies on June 25-26, 2015.

2.3 Central to the Ulaanbaatar Process is the emerging strategic role of Mongolia within the Northeast Asian
context. Mongolia is a state with internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status that benefits from political security assurance of the five nuclear weapon states. It also maintains friendly diplomatic relations with all the states of the Six Party Talks and other states of the region. Hence it is well-positioned to play a significant and unique role as provider of political space and venue as well as a possible mediator for regional dialogue. The Mongolian government has supported GPPAC by hosting regional GPPAC meetings in 2007, 2010 and 2014 in Ulaanbaatar, focusing on various issues, including reducing nuclear threats through regional dialogue. GPPAC's Ulaanbaatar Focal Point, the NGO Blue Banner, plays the lead role in this coordination. Reflecting the role of Mongolia in this process, this dialogue is referred to as the 'Ulaanbaatar Process'.

2.4 Crucially, the Ulaanbaatar Process creates space for civil society perspectives from across the region, including both the DPRK and ROK, to be heard in the same forum. As a global network based on multi-stakeholder collaboration, with a foundation for constructive dialogue already developed by the GPPAC-NEA network in the region and with a neutral platform and location in Mongolia to convene the different parties, the Ulaanbaatar Process is uniquely positioned to serve as an effective regional Track 2 dialogue.

Section 3. Objectives
3.1 The overall objective of the Ulaanbaatar Process is to support the creation of peace and stability throughout Northeast Asia, through the promotion of civil society dialogue.

3.2 The specific objectives of the Ulaanbaatar Process are:
3.2.1 To strengthen the role of civil society in the context of building peace and stability in Northeast Asia
3.2.2 To complement and contribute recommendations to official processes
3.2.3 To support the development of an institutionalized regional mechanism supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Northeast Asia
3.2.4 To contribute to overall confidence-building measures within the Northeast Asian region

Section 4. Expected Impact
4.1 In strengthening the role of civil society to contribute to regional peace and security, the expected impact of the Ulaanbaatar Process is as follows:
4.1.1 Opportunities for civil society representatives from the entire Northeast Asian region and from the larger GPPAC network, including representatives from the United States, to meet and exchange knowledge on a regular basis are created.
4.1.2 Collaboration among civil society actors on initiatives to promote peace and stability in the region is strengthened.
4.1.3 The Ulaanbaatar Process receives recognition and support from the countries in the region.
4.1.4 Increased level of trust and collaboration amongst civil society groups in the region.
4.1.5 Suggestions and recommendations coming out of the Ulaanbaatar process are increasingly discussed among governments and other relevant stakeholders in the region.

Section 5. Governing Principles
5.1 The Ulaanbaatar Process, in its activities and practices, will be:
- Inclusive
- Respectful of cultural norms and differences
- Focused on peacebuilding opportunities, rather than security threats
- Attentive to human security concerns
- Cognizant of regional and global geopolitical realities
- Collaborative
- Open and respectful in its communication

Section 6. Priority Thematic Areas
6.1 As decided at the inaugural Ulaanbaatar Process Meeting (23-24 June 2015), the Ulaanbaatar Process will address selected core themes and cross-cutting issues in 2015 and 2016.
6.1.1 In 2015-2016, the Ulaanbaatar Process will address the following Main Themes:
a) Issues pertaining to peace and human security on the Korean Peninsula
b) Establishment of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

6.1.2 The interconnectedness of the two main themes was recognized. Subtopics to be addressed in the context of the two main themes listed in 6.1.1 include but are not limited to:
- Ending the Korean War with the replacement of the armistice with a permanent peace treaty
- Trust and confidence building in Northeast Asia
- Denuclearization and disarmament of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
- Energy security in Northeast Asia

6.1.3 The Ulaanbaatar Process will also address the following Cross-cutting issues in this stage:
a) The role of civil society in Northeast Asian security and peace dialogue
b) Gender mainstreaming and equality in Northeast Asia

6.2 While the above-mentioned topics have been identified for the period 2015-2016, the Process may continue to address them should participants feel that they remain relevant. Alternatively, the participants of the Ulaanbaatar Process may redefine the priority thematic areas after discussion and consensus amongst themselves.

6.3 Each Ulaanbaatar Process Meeting will seek to address at least one priority thematic area in detail.

Section 7. Relationship to Other Processes
7.1 The Ulaanbaatar Process will seek a complementary relationship with the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue for Northeast Asian Security, facilitated by the NGO Blue Banner in consultation and agreement with the GPPAC Global Secretariat and the GPPAC NEA Regional Secretariat.

7.2 Contributions to Track 1 and 1.5 Processes will be pursued, particularly through the transmission of relevant outcomes of Ulaanbaatar Process meetings to relevant actors.

Section 8. Coordination and Participation
8.1 The coordinating members of the Ulaanbaatar Process are the GPPAC Global Secretariat and Northeast Asia Regional Secretariat, and Mongolian NGO Blue Banner. These bodies will be responsible for strategic and programme coordination, logistical management, resource mobilization, monitoring and evaluation, and communications, with duties to be allocated amongst the three.

8.1.1 GPPAC Global Secretariat: The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a worldwide civil society network structured around 15 regional networks. GPPAC promotes conflict prevention and peacebuilding through a network and multi-stakeholder approach. The Global Secretariat, based in the Hague, operates under the GPPAC Foundation and supports the work of the GPPAC network, through facilitating and ensuring synergy and coherence of GPPAC activities.

8.1.2 GPPAC Northeast Asia Regional Secretariat: The Northeast Asia region of GPPAC is a network of CSOs that closely collaborate throughout this region, with focal points and partners in Beijing, Hong Kong, Kyoto, Pyongyang, Seoul, Shanghai, Taipei, Tokyo, Ulaanbaatar and Vladivostok. A civil society-led dialogue process in support of dialogue is a long-standing priority for GPPAC NEA. The Regional Secretariat is based at the NGO Peace Boat in Tokyo.

8.1.3 Blue Banner: A Mongolian non-governmental organization established in 2005 to promote nuclear non-proliferation and Mongolia’s initiative to turn the country into a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone (NUWFZ). It believes that the government of Mongolia needs to promote more vigorously the policy of establishing and institutionalizing the concept of the single-State NUWFZ, and that independent think tanks can make useful practical suggestions to the government on the ways and means of promoting the initiative, including the form and content of Mongolia’s unique status. To that end it undertakes special area studies and presents its findings and recommendations to the general public or the government as the case may be.

8.2 Participants in the Ulaanbaatar Process will comprise a combination of GPPAC Northeast Asia members and delegates from partner civil society organizations. Furthermore, other actors may be invited according to relevant
experience in relation to thematic areas being addressed, upon consultation with regional participants and coordinators. Participating organizations of the Ulaanbaatar Process are expected to make an institutional commitment to being present at relevant meetings and to being involved in the Process as a whole through active communication between meetings. (For a list of participants of the Ulaanbaatar Process at the time of launching, please see Annex: List of Participants)

Section 9. Engagement and Target Groups

9.1 Participants of the Process recognize that its positioning as the unique regular meeting of representatives of civil society groups from Northeast Asia is its strength. As such, participation in the Ulaanbaatar Process will continue to be limited to individuals and civil society groups, bearing in mind that:

9.1.1 With a focus on creating and supporting peacebuilding opportunities, the discussions will address how civil society can resolve both traditional and non-traditional security challenges through peaceful and collaborative means. To this end, experts on dialogue and mediation, including representatives of GPPAC’s Dialogue and Mediation Working Group, may also be invited.

9.1.2 Participants in the Ulaanbaatar Process have links and channels of communication with government, think tanks, and security sector, peace and other networks. The Process can engage secondary actors without directly inviting them to participate in meetings by relying on the connections and communications channels of Participants.

9.2 Where the Process stands to gain from the involvement of governments, regional organizations or international organizations (henceforth, “Officials”) the participants and coordinating members may:

9.2.1 organize side meetings with Officials and some or all of the Ulaanbaatar Process participants

9.2.2 invite Officials to make presentations or participate in discussions in specific sessions as resource persons

9.2.3 bring recommendations from Official meetings, to the Ulaanbaatar Process for discussion and analysis

9.3 The participants of the Process also recognize the need to engage with individuals and organizations with opposing or alternative views in order to better understand their concerns, preconceptions, priorities and constraints.

9.4 The Ulaanbaatar Process may seek the involvement or participation of experts and activists from other regions, particularly recognizing the value of learning from other peacebuilding, reconciliation and regional integration efforts.

9.5 Mass media and social media are identified as key stakeholder groups with which the Ulaanbaatar Process should aim to engage.

Section 10. Core activities – Making a habit of Dialogue

10.1 The core activity of the Ulaanbaatar Process is the dialogue between Northeast Asian civil society members in itself. To this end, the Process aims to:

• Hold regular, face-to-face, closed-door meetings among members of civil society groups in the Northeast Asian region

• Change the prevailing narrative surrounding the contentious geopolitical relationships in the Northeast Asian region by promoting communication and cooperation amongst the Participants of the Process. Demonstrate that sincere and constructive dialogue is possible in Northeast Asia by establishing a safe space for participation from all countries.

10.2 Other potential activities of the Ulaanbaatar Process to create opportunities for collaboration and cooperation outside of the annual meetings

• Working groups – to prepare or organize follow-up activities on specific topics between meetings; to provide regular update to national governments

• Alternative meetings – Virtual webinars or roundtables could be organized between annual face-to-face meetings

• Capacity development initiatives – Workshops and seminars could be organized by Participants to share skills or knowledge
• Joint action – Actions on specific issues can be organized by interested Participants
• Report Sessions in Track 1 or Track 1.5 Meetings

10.3 In addition to face-to-face meetings:
• Strategic and targeted action-oriented policy recommendations could be prepared in the form of brief communiqués and disseminated to governments and Track 1 or 1.5 level meetings
• Journal articles analyzing key issues in the region or outlining the outcome of the Ulaanbaatar Process could be written by Participants

Section 11. Funding
11.1 The three Coordinating Members will be responsible for mobilizing resources for the Ulaanbaatar Process, including for both specific activities and meetings and the ongoing management of the process itself.
11.2 Other Participants are not obliged to make financial commitments, however any contributions will be welcome, including in kind contributions and cooperation in fundraising efforts.

Section 12. Visibility
12.1 The Coordinating Members will be responsible for ensuring that the Process’ interactions with media stakeholders are in-line with its overall media strategy.
12.2 All Participants of the Ulaanbaatar Process will be responsible for the visibility of the Process, in particular in their own country/context of work. In this regard, Participants are encouraged to share non-confidential material concerning the Process with their media contacts.
12.3 In the interest of maintaining a frank and open dialogue, Ulaanbaatar Process Meetings will be treated as confidential; and statements made during meetings will not be attributable to any individual unless permission has been expressly granted by the Participants of the Process. All questions regarding confidentiality should be addressed to the GPPAC Regional Secretariat.

Section 13. Time-frame and Targets
13.1
13.1.1 Resource mobilization is secured in line with the plans agreed upon for 2015 activities
13.1.2 A funding plan (for long-term activities) is prepared and endorsed by members
13.1.3 A visibility plan is prepared and endorsed by members
13.1.4 Organization of 2nd Ulaanbaatar Process Meeting in Ulaanbaatar in mid-2016. (TBC pending availability of funds and suitability of proposed timing of the Meeting)
13.1.5 Government contacts are informed and updated

13.2 Years 2-5
13.2.1 Organization of annual Ulaanbaatar Process Meetings
13.2.2 Review of the Ulaanbaatar Process and evaluation of its reach and impact to be conducted
13.2.4 Project-based funding is sought and obtained for selected Ulaanbaatar Process activities
13.2.5 Outcomes of the Ulaanbaatar Process are gradually and increasingly visible and measurable

Section 14. Monitoring and Evaluation
14.1 Internal reporting
The activities organized as part of the Ulaanbaatar Process will be subject to a regular monitoring and evaluation process. GPPAC will be responsible to organise this, consistent with the collaborative methodology it is applying across its network. In technical terms, GPPAC utilises “Outcome Mapping”, which allows for a deeper appreciation for the diversity of factors which affect the complexities inherent in long-term, effective dialogue. Outcome Mapping provides a suitable approach for the Ulaanbaatar to monitor, reflect and learn on how civil society can be strengthened and better contribute to the peace and security of the Northeast Asian region.
ANNEX  IV  p.27-29

A/RES/69/63
11 December 2014
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2014
69/63. Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status

ANNEX  V  p.30-31

Joint Declaration, the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

ANNEX  VI  p.32-33

DECLARATION BY MONGOLIA REGARDING ITS NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS
http://www.mfa.gov.mn/?p=29182