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外部経済と先手有利性


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Title: 外部経済と先手有利性
Other Titles: First Mover Advantage in Perfect Information Duopoly Games with External Economy
Authors: 村田, 省三
Authors (alternative): Murata, Shozo
Issue Date: Dec-2007
Citation: 經營と經濟. 2007, 87(3), p. 29-42
Abstract: In this paper we consider the output level of equilibrium in Cournot duopoly game with perfect information. It is known that there is first mover advantage in ordinal perfect information Cournot game and output level of the game equilibiria is smaller than it of Stackelberg game. But this is not true in Cournot duopoly game with perfect information if there is external economy on one firm of duopoly firms. In this case, because of positive sloped reaction curve of the firm with external economy, Stackelberg equilibrium point locates on the left side to Cournot equlibrium point. Therefore Stackelberg leader can not increase his production lebel from it of Cournot-Nash equilibria through the best reply curve. And under some conditions, second mover advantage will occur in duopoly game with perfect information.
Description: 笠原俊彦教授定年退職記念号
Keywords: first mover advantage / Cournot duopoly
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/21377
ISSN: 02869101
Type: Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version: publisher
Appears in Collections:Volume 87, No. 3

Citable URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/21377

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