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Hamilton & Slutsky (1990)定理7の構造

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タイトル: Hamilton & Slutsky (1990)定理7の構造
その他のタイトル: Two commitment games in Hamilton & Slutsky (1990)
著者: 村田, 省三 / 橋口, 真理子
発行日: 2010年 6月30日
出版者: 長崎大学経済学部 / Faculty of Economis, Nagasaki University
引用: 長崎大学経済学部研究年報, 26, pp.49-54; 2010
抄録: In this paper, we consider two commitment games in Hamilton&Slutsky(1990).The condition for the existence of the mixed strategy equilibria is shown by theorem 5 for the extended game with observable delay. In this case, the refinement by subgame perfectness concept for the equilibria being valid fully over all of 5 subgames, the strategy pair not locates on the intersection of two best reply curves leads to a contradiction. This eases the difficulties of the analysis to verify the mixed strategy equilibria. In the case of the extended game of action commitment, if both players choose wait strategy, the best reply induced in the following stage inevitably leads to select the intersection of two best reply curves. On the contrary to this, comittment strategy by both does not always come to the intersection. The proof that an action commitment game does not have a mixed strategy equilibria remains unproved so far. In this paper, one solution to this existence problem is suggested by Theorem1. In every duoply game satisfying some regular conditions as in Pastine&Pastine(2004),there is no nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria carried by commitments which is located in Pareto superior set.
キーワード: commitment game / mixed strategy / Pareto dominance / quantity setting game
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/24468
ISSN: 09108602
資料タイプ: Departmental Bulletin Paper
原稿種類: publisher

引用URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/24468



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