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Hamilton and Sultsky (1990) 定理8をめぐる論点

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Title: Hamilton and Sultsky (1990) 定理8をめぐる論点
Other Titles: A Consideration to Theorem 8 in Hamilton and Sultsky (1990)
Authors: 村田, 省三
Authors (alternative): Murata, Shozo
Issue Date: 25-Sep-2012
Publisher: 長崎大学経済学会 / Economics Society of Nagasaki University
Citation: 經營と經濟, 92(1-2), pp.173-180; 2012
Abstract: In this paper, we reconsider the two person commitment game of Theorem 8 in Hamilton and Sultsky (1990),and point out that there must be simultaneous move Nash equilibria in this commitment game. This equilibria does not deleted by some dominant strategy. Simultaneous move Nash equilibrium is not dominated by the waiting strategy in the two person commitment game. Therefore, the experimental evidence obtained in Fonseca et al (2006) is not contradiction. Simultaneous move Nash equilibrium will appear most frequently.
Description: 是枝正啓教授、内田滋教授定年退職記念号 / In Honour of Prof. Masahiro Koreeda and Prof. Shigeru Uchida
Keywords: commitment game / simultaneous move equilibria / undominated strategy
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/29504
ISSN: 02869101
Type: Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version: publisher
Appears in Collections:Volume 92 No. 1-2

Citable URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/29504

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