DSpace university logo mark
Advanced Search
Japanese | English 

NAOSITE : Nagasaki University's Academic Output SITE > Faculty of Economics > Bulletin > Journal of business and economics > Volume 93 No. 4 >


File Description SizeFormat
Keizai93_4_19.pdf282.76 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Title: コミットメントゲームの均衡と利潤関数の臨界点
Other Titles: Critical Point of Profit Function and the Equilibria of Commitment Games in Hamilton and Slutsky(1990)
Authors: 村田, 省三
Authors (alternative): Murata, Shozo
Issue Date: 25-Mar-2014
Publisher: 長崎大学経済学会 / Economics Society of Nagasaki University
Citation: 経営と経済, 93(4), pp.19-32; 2014
Abstract: In this paper, we consider the equilibrium of games with observable delay in Hamilton & Slutsky (1990).The condition for the equilibria in theorem 5 is still insufficient for determininng the order of commitment games. In this paper, we give one solution to this insufficiency problem. The essential point of this problem is that the critical point of the profit function is not in the strategic field of the game as Amir model.
Keywords: commitment game / Pareto dominance / Isoquant
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/34249
ISSN: 02869101
Type: Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version: publisher
Appears in Collections:Volume 93 No. 4

Citable URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/34249

All items in NAOSITE are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


Valid XHTML 1.0! Copyright © 2006-2015 Nagasaki University Library - Feedback Powerd by DSpace