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Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation


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Title: Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
Authors: Ito, Hiromu / Tanimoto, Jun
Issue Date: 5-Aug-2020
Publisher: Royal Society Publishing
Citation: Royal Society Open Science, 7(8), art.no.200891; 2020
Abstract: Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.
Keywords: altruism / evolutionary games / expected utility theory / social dilemma / social viscosity
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/40313
ISSN: 20545703
DOI: 10.1098/rsos.200891
Rights: © 2020 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
Type: Journal Article
Text Version: publisher
Appears in Collections:Articles in academic journal

Citable URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/40313

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