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Title: チェーンストアパラドックスと均衡戦略
Other Titles: On the Perfectness Concept for the Sequential Equilibrium of Chain Store Game with Imperfect Information
Authors: 村田, 省三
Authors (alternative): Murata, Shozo
Issue Date: 25-Mar-2005
Citation: 經營と經濟. vol.84(4), p.69-86; 2005
Abstract: In this paper we consider the sequential equilibrium of multistage chainstore games with imperfect information. We point out that the consistent belief in this sequential equilibrium would be avoided in terms of inconsistency which turns out that the incumbent must be a weak firm. Rational player would not choice such strategy. In this case Selten's examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games would be invalid.
Keywords: chainstore game / sequential equilibrium / belief
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/6851
ISSN: 02869101
Type: Departmental Bulletin Paper
Appears in Collections:Volume 84, No. 4

Citable URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/6851

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