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タイトル: クールノーゲームの均衡とシュタッケルベルグゲームの均衡における生産規模について
その他のタイトル: Output Levels in the Quantity Setting Cournot Game and Stackelberg Game
著者: 村田, 省三
著者(別表記) : Murata, Shozo
発行日: 2005年 9月26日
引用: 經營と經濟. vol.85(1-2), p.115-133; 2005
抄録: In this paper we consider the relation between total output level in the Nash equilibrium of the quantity setting Cournot duopoly game and it of Stackelberg game with liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions especially under conditions of negative marginal costs. In ordinal case, positive marginal costs are assumed, and the total output level of Cournot equilibia does not exceed it of Stackelberg equilibria because the best reply curve or line of the first player is rapidly declining compared to it of the second player, thus first mover has advantage to second mover. In the case of negative marginal costs, total output level in the equilibrium of Cournot game will be able to overtake the ones of Stackelberg game because of the slowly declining best reply curve of first mover compared to second mover. Hamilton=Slutsky(1990) classified some downward sloping bestreply lines with convex isoprofit curves, but they treated this is not the case, and the numerical consideration of this case was left unconsidered.
キーワード: Cournot game / Stackelberg game / Second mover advantage / Best reply
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/6852
ISSN: 02869101
資料タイプ: Departmental Bulletin Paper
出現コレクション:第85巻 第1-2号

引用URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/6852



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