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Title: 生命保険募集におけるモラル・リスクの研究-事前審査にかかるインセンティブの観点からの検討-
Other Titles: Optimal Wage Schedule When a Life Underwriter Has Multiple Tasks
Authors: 大倉, 真人
Authors (alternative): Okura, Mahito
Issue Date: Jun-2002
Publisher: 日本リスク研究学会
Citation: 『日本リスク研究学会誌』第13巻第2号 pp.111-117 2002.6
Abstract: This paper investigates the wage schedule of a life underwriter with multiple tasks. A life insurance company desires life underwriters to effort not only to sell insurance products but also to monitor an insured. It concludes that every life insurance companies should weaken the incentive intensity of volume on her wage schedule in order to prevent to commit an insurance fraud
Keywords: insurance fraud / selections of risk / multitask principal-agent model / incentive intensity
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10069/6922
ISSN: 09155465
Type: Journal Article
Text Version: author
Appears in Collections:Articles in academic journal

Citable URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10069/6922

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